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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released by the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
2010, announced an unprecedented shift in the U.S. nuclear policy away from state-based threats 
to nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism concerns. While these issues remain important, the 
evolving global strategic environment dictates that the next NPR return to a state-centric, strategic 
focus emphasizing four states: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The only strategic peer to the 
United States, Russia, is actively modernizing all aspects of its nuclear arsenal and has placed non-
strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) at the center of its national security.1 China has overhauled 
the structure of its nuclear weapons program and nuclear and missile developments in North Korea 
are ongoing. Not long ago Iran reached the cusp of nuclear capability before the implementation 
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The United States must now ensure that this 
agreement is implemented effectively. All of these developments make it impossible to ignore the 
importance of nuclear weapons in the U.S. global strategic posture today.  
With changing capabilities and postures in each of these four states, extended deterrence 
challenges will feature prominently in the next NPR. In Europe, reductions in U.S. manpower and 
the minimization of NSNWs in NATO’s war-fighting strategy have called into question the U.S. 
ability to defend the Baltic States from potential Russian aggression in the region. In Asia-Pacific, 
Japan and South Korea are concerned whether current U.S. capabilities will adequately deter China 
and North Korea, especially given the ongoing developments in Chinese and North Korean str 
arsenals. In the Middle East, Gulf allies remain concerned about the threat of a future nuclear Iran. 
In light of the resurgence of these state threats to U.S. allies, the next NPR must consider a range 
of options to address the growing challenges to extended deterrence and assurance across Europe, 
Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East.  
Beyond extended deterrence, the next NPR must address three other key issues. First, the 
U.S. must consider the balance between extended nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence, 
especially when considering states with limited nuclear arsenals such as North Korea. Second, the 
U.S. must consider its global strategic messaging and assess its impact upon central and extended 
deterrence. Third, as parts of the U.S. strategic triad have already exceeded their intended service 
lives, the U.S. must assess the modernization priorities for the nuclear triad and infrastructure. 
Nuclear security will also continue to be a significant concern for upcoming 
administrations. Although progress has been made since 2010, new challenges have emerged that 
increasingly threaten the security of nuclear materials, infrastructure, and command and control 
systems. First, the U.S. must consider the growing cyber threats to its nuclear infrastructure posed 
by state and non-state actors. Second, the U.S. must consider ways to continue the international 
momentum towards locking down global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. This is a 
dominant concern for continuing progress in nuclear security. Although a recent series of nuclear 
security summits championed by the current presidential administration made significant 
international strides, Russia’s withdrawal from various cooperation regimes, including the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), could have serious implications for the security of 
nuclear materials, weapons, and technology. 
There is one further topic worth consideration in the next NPR that was entirely absent in 
the 2010 report. This is nuclear crisis management of a conflict to which the U.S. is a third party. 
Nuclear crisis management is of grave importance for the U.S. because any violation of the non-
                                                 
1 Woolf, Amy F. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015, p. 23 
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use norm could facilitate further escalation and continued use of nuclear weapons—especially 
NSNW—in the global system. With the development of new nuclear capabilities and doctrines by 
many nuclear states, the U.S. must consider whether its current crisis management strategies and 
frameworks are prepared to handle the range of nuclear crises that could emerge in the future.  
 The global nuclear environment has shifted significantly since 2010. These changes mean 
that the next NPR must return to a state-centric, strategic focus in order to adequately face 
emerging challenges to the global security environment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced a shift in U.S. nuclear policy away 
from state-based threats to the threats relating to nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.2 The 
NPR announced that it was time to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “better align our nuclear 
policies and posture to our most urgent priorities—preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation.”3 While the NPR did highlight the ambiguity of the Chinese and Russian nuclear 
weapons programs, it largely limited the prescription for addressing these concerns to high-level, 
bilateral dialogues with both countries to produce more stable, strategic relationships.4 Significant 
shifts in U.S. relations with both of these states make it increasingly difficult to pursue these 
options. 
 While nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation remain important concerns, global events 
since the 2010 NPR require a return to a state-centric strategic focus. Four state actors are of 
particular concern for the United States: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recent nuclear 
developments within these states matter—all of them have threatened U.S. allies and have resorted 
to (or sought) nuclear weapons to strengthen their ability to challenge the United States or its 
interests.  
 Since the 2010 NPR, Russia has grown increasingly aggressive towards the U.S. and its 
allies. Russia labeled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a threat to its national 
security in a recent update to its national security strategy.5 In addition, Russia has opposed many 
of the security interests of the U.S. and its allies since the last NPR, most notably with its 
annexation of Crimea and its support for Bashar-al Assad’s regime in Syria. In the nuclear arena, 
Russia has grown more dependent upon non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) as a means of 
bridging the conventional weapons capability gap with the U.S. Most threatening is its “escalate 
to de-escalate” doctrine, which calls for the use of Russian NSNW to coerce its adversaries to back 
down in a conflict.6 If clearly employed defensively, such a doctrine might not be a critical 
confrontation for the United States. For example, the American New Look doctrine in the 1950s 
similarly relied upon NSNWs as a means of countering perceived Soviet conventional superiority 
in Europe. However, what is different about the Russian “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine is that 
Russian policymakers have threatened to use NSNWs to support its invasions of sovereign states, 
such as Ukraine.7 This doctrine has grim implications for U.S. extended deterrence in Europe, 
especially with the U.S. obligation to come to the defense of NATO allies, such as the Baltic States 
along Russia’s Western border.  
                                                 
2 The Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, p. 5. 
3 Ibid, p. 6.  
4 Ibid, p. 28. 
5 Farchy, Jack. "Putin Names NATO among Threats in New Russian Security Strategy." The Financial Times. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz45UrSJyac (accessed March 4, 
2016). 
6 Woolf, Amy F. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015, p. 23. 
7 Paul Sonne, "As Tensions With West Rise, Russia Increasingly Rattles Nuclear Saber," The Wall Street Journal. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-tensions-with-west-rise-russia-increasingly-rattles-nuclear-saber-1428249620 
(accessed April 22, 2016). 
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 Similarly, China has infringed on the security of U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific with its 
militarization of the South China Sea and its continuing escalation of the conflict over the Diaoyu 
/ Senkaku Islands. At the same time, China has undertaken significant nuclear modernization 
programs since the 2010 NPR. In conjunction with a quantitative increase in its nuclear arsenal, 
China has also begun actively upgrading nuclear warheads and delivery systems, such as the 
conversion of its single warhead missiles into multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRV) to improve survivability.8 The U.S. should consider whether such capabilities simply 
enhance strategic stability or whether these improvements undermine the ability of the U.S. to 
intervene against China’s increasingly assertive military actions in the Asia-Pacific. 
Unsurprisingly, Chinese nuclear modernization, in conjunction with its increasing aggression in 
the region, has generated concern among U.S. allies about the strength of American extended 
deterrence in the region as escalatory risks continue to increase.  
 North Korea, an international pariah, has also made improvements in its nuclear weapons 
program since the 2010 NPR. U.S. Commander of the United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) Admiral William Gortney and General Curtis Scaparotti of U.S. Forces Korea 
both assert that North Korea can now miniaturize nuclear devices.9 This, coupled with ongoing 
satellite launches which likely serve as de facto tests for long-range ballistic missiles, are important 
steps toward developing a nuclear capability that could reach the mainland United States.10 
Although it is unlikely North Korea has detonated its first hydrogen bomb as it claimed in January 
of 2016, the improvements to its nuclear weapons technology does indicate that North Korea has 
evolved in a more threatening direction since the 2010 NPR. These developments have enormous 
significance for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance in the Asia-Pacific.  
 Finally, since the 2010 NPR, Iran has expanded its regional influence in the Middle East 
to new heights with its active involvement in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in conflict with the interests 
of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Iran coupled this expansionist role with the pursuit of a nuclear 
weapons program. Before the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), Iran’s nuclear weapons program had progressed to the point at which it could have 
constructed a device within two to three months.11 Although the JCPOA has reduced the 
immediacy of the Iran nuclear threat, it is unclear if the U.S. and the international community will 
be able to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the long-term. The U.S. must ensure the 
effective implementation of the JCPOA, but also begin to hedge for a possibility of a nuclear Iran 
and how it could affect U.S. extended deterrence and assurance in the Middle East.  
 In conjunction with a reorientation toward state-based threats, the next NPR must address 
several key areas strongly related to extended deterrence and the assurance of allies. First, with 
Russia and other states increasing the role of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, the United States 
must consider what role U.S. non-strategic and conventional weapons should have in its own 
                                                 
8 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015: 
U.S. Department of Defense, 2015. 
9 Snyder, Scott A. "U.S. Assessments of North Korean Missile Capabilities since 2011." Council on Foreign 
Relations. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/02/07/u-s-assessments-of-north-korean-missile-capabilities-since-2011 
(accessed February 9, 2016). 
10 "Kim Jong Un’s War Games: North Korea Tests another Missile." The Economist. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/daily-chart-6. (accessed February 9, 2016). 
11 Nephew, Richard. "Based on Breakout Timelines, the World is Better Off with the Iran Nuclear Deal than without 
it." The Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/07/17-iran-breakout-nephew 
(accessed February 26, 2016). 
NPR Capstone  May 2016 
 
 8  
posture. Second, the United States must also consider whether current capabilities provide 
adequate reassurance to allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.  
 
Nuclear Security and Modernization 
 The next NPR must address three important issues that were neglected or underserved by 
the previous NPR. First, the United States must address the modernization of its aging strategic 
nuclear arsenal and nuclear infrastructure. This comprises a variety of issues including the 
enduring necessity of all legs of the U.S. nuclear triad (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)). If security and extended deterrence 
concerns justify the retention of the triad, then it is important to prioritize future nuclear 
modernization objectives. Furthermore, it is important to address the financial cost of the 
modernization effort, especially in relation to conventional modernization priorities. 
Second, cyber vulnerabilities must be included in any discussion of U.S. nuclear 
infrastructure improvements. A cyber threat could emerge from either a state adversary (e.g. 
Russia) or a non-state organization, like al-Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State (ISIL), which are 
continuing to improve their capabilities in this arena. Vulnerabilities within the U.S. nuclear 
infrastructure created by years of neglect further accentuate these dangers. Numerous officials—
such as General C. Robert Kehler, commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)—
have expressed concern about what an advanced cyber-attack on the U.S. nuclear architecture 
could achieve.12 While the idea of an offensive cyber-attack being used to launch a U.S. nuclear 
warhead is not realistic, it is known that cyber-attacks can do real physical damage to nuclear 
facilities and related infrastructure. 
Third, the next NPR should examine the current and future state of global nuclear security 
as an essential component of preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Important 
areas to further examine include the security of nuclear stockpiles globally—with special attention 
to former Soviet states—and encouraging other states to reduce the production of highly enriched 
uranium, a primary source for a nuclear explosive. Unfortunately, Russia’s refusal to extend the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) agreement with the U.S. will make these goals more 
difficult. In addition, the United States must reinforce the security of nuclear sites at home and 
among allies abroad; for example, the Belgian police discovered that the same terror cell 
responsible for the 2015 Paris attacks used a video camera to monitor a high-ranking Belgian 
official with access to nuclear and radiological material in Belgian nuclear facilities.13 Although 
the Obama administration’s Nuclear Security Summits are a step in the right direction, the next 
NPR should consider the need for a broader improvement of the security of nuclear sites and 
securing nuclear weapons materials abroad. 
There is one further topic worth consideration in the next NPR that was entirely absent in 
the 2010 report: nuclear crisis management of a conflict to which the U.S. is a third party. Nuclear 
crisis management is of grave importance for the United States because any violation of the non-
use norm could facilitate further escalation and continued use of nuclear weapons—especially 
NSNW—in the global system. With the development of new nuclear capabilities and doctrines by 
many nuclear states, the United States must consider whether its current crisis management 
                                                 
12 Farnsworth, Timothy. "Study Sees Cyber Risk for U.S. Arsenal." Arms Control Association. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_04/Study-Sees-Cyber-Risk-for-US-Arsenal (accessed March 1, 2016). 
13 Schreuer, Milan and Rubin, Alissa J. "Video found in Belgium of Nuclear Official may Point to Bigger Plot." The 
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/world/europe/belgium-nuclear-official-video-paris-
attacks.html (accessed February 25, 2016). 
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strategies and frameworks are prepared to handle the range of nuclear crises that could emerge in 
the future. Although there has been significant analysis of Cold War era crises involving the U.S. 
and Soviet Union, as well as discussion of potential crises that could arise involving an ally under 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this third form of crisis in which the U.S. might not have any direct 
alliance commitments has been notably absent in policy making. 
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STRATEGIC CONCERNS 
 
Four states currently dominate the security environment of the U.S. and allied partners 
worldwide: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The first three have already acquired nuclear 
capabilities and all have significantly updated their nuclear programs. Although Iran has 
temporarily halted its nuclear weapons program as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), the agreement does not provide a long-term guarantee that Iran will not pursue 
a nuclear weapons program in the future. 
 In accordance with these growing state threats, the key focus of this report is centered on 
strategic level concerns. To help unfold the unique dynamics presented by each of these challenges, 
this report addresses the “theories of victory” for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. This report 
draws upon the work of former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy, Brad Roberts who defines a theory of victory as “a set of concepts for how to force 
termination of a war in a manner favorable to one’s objectives and to achieve an acceptable post-
war balance of power."14 For all four states, the theory of victory does not involve the outright 
defeat of the U.S. in a conflict; instead, they focus on raising the costs of U.S. interference in a 
conflict to unacceptably high levels. Understanding this concept for each state is essential for 
structuring the U.S. extended deterrence and assurance postures in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and 
the Middle East. This section will cover the theories of victories for each of these countries in 
further detail. 
RUSSIA  
 
When considering the state-level focus of the upcoming NPR, Russia must remain central. 
Russia is the only nuclear peer competitor of the United States, and it has pursued a nuclear 
modernization program since the previous NPR. Furthermore, Russia’s aggression against Georgia 
and Ukraine has alarmed Eastern European NATO members, especially the Baltic States. With 
Russia’s continued nuclear modernization and aggressive policies, it is essential that the U.S. deter 
Russia from threatening NATO states and assures allies that the U.S. is committed to the defense 
of NATO and the preservation of regional stability. In order to address this growing concern, it is 
important to understand Russia’s nuclear security posture and the current U.S. extended deterrence 
posture in Europe. 
 
National Strategy 
 
The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation provides insights regarding the 
purpose of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the growing concern it presents for the U.S. and NATO. 
In this document, Russia emphasized the danger it faces from NATO, including enhanced U.S. 
conventional capabilities and the continued presence of NATO on its borders. Alexander Grushko, 
Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, identified NATO’s current posture as a 
“determination to contain Russia.”15 This sense of vulnerability is also influenced by Russian 
domestic politics and a fear of U.S. interference through the promotion of so-called color (pro-
                                                 
14 Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21St Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016, 
p. 13. 
15 "NATO's Determination to Contain Russia Dangerous," PravdaReport, 
http://www.pravdareport.com/news/world/15-02-2016/133334-nato_rusia-0 (accessed April 22, 2016). 
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democracy) revolutions among its neighbors.16 In response to this perceived threat, Russia has 
reemphasized the role of NSNWs as a means of countering NATO’s superior conventional 
capabilities within its security strategies.  
Russia enhanced the role of NSNWs in its national strategy through its doctrine of “escalate 
to deescalate.”17 This doctrine calls for the Russian use of NSNWs early in a conflict in order to 
make the cost of continuing the conflict for its adversary too high to pursue.18 A specific scenario 
in which Russia has threatened to employ this doctrine is in response to an attempt by Ukraine 
and/or the West to retake Crimea from Russian forces. Regarding the annexation of Crimea, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, “We were ready to do this [put nuclear forces on 
alert]…and that is why I think no one was in the mood to start a world war.”19 This policy generates 
troubling implications for the U.S. and NATO. Although Russia has not initiated a conflict against 
a state to which the U.S. has a security obligation, the recent Russian invasions of Georgia and 
Ukraine indicate that the U.S. and NATO ought to plan for a Russian invasion of the Baltic States 
and other Eastern European allies. In the event of a Russian conflict with the Baltic States, NATO 
would have to be prepared to respond to the use of NSNWs from Russia. NATO forces could very 
well be faced with the choice of either risking nuclear escalation or suing for peace on terms 
favorable to Russia. The latter option could undermine the credibility of both NATO and U.S. 
extended deterrence in Europe or perhaps even globally. This understanding of Russian doctrine 
illustrates why the U.S. must ensure that deterrence does not fail in Eastern Europe.  
 
Developments and Capabilities 
 
Like those of the U.S., Russia’s strategic nuclear forces consist of a triad—land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. It is estimated that Russia currently possesses roughly 1,650 
active strategic warheads.20 Pursuant to the 2010 New START treaty, Russia is committed to 
reducing its active stockpile to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads by February 2018.21 However, 
this does not prevent Russia from the active modernization of its current nuclear arsenal. 
Russia does not disclose its numbers of non-strategic weapons, however it is estimated that 
Russia deploys approximately 2,000 active NSNWs.22 Although the secrecy of Russia’s NSNW 
program makes it difficult to pinpoint the deployment of Russia’s NSNWs, an estimate from Hans 
Kristensen of the Arms Control Association estimates that Russia has 170 warheads for Army 
missiles, 430 warheads for missile-and air defense forces, 730 warheads for the air force, and 700 
                                                 
16 Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21St Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016, 
p. 129. 
17 Пыж, В. В. Геополитическая обусловленность военной политики России. Можайск, РФ: Можайск-Терра, 
2003, c. 166. 
18 Colby, Elbridge. Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagon’s 
New Initiative: Center for a New American Security, February 2015, p. 7. 
19 Russia's Nuclear Posture: National Institute for Public Policy, March, 2015. 
20 "Russia," Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2016, accessed April 22, 2016, 
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Lewis, Jeffrey. "Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons." Arms Control Wonk. 
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/203309/russian-tactical-nuclear-weapons/ (accessed February 17, 2016). 
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naval nonstrategic nuclear warheads.23 These figures indicate that Russia relies upon a variety of 
delivery vehicles for its NSNWs, unlike the United States, which solely relies upon its bombers. 
 
Nuclear Modernization 
 
Russia started to modernize all three legs of its triad in 2011 and announced a total 
allocation of $70 billion for the replacement and introduction of new nuclear capabilities.24 Since 
2011, Russia has made some progress. First, Russia is more than halfway finished with the 
replacement of its Soviet-era ICBMs. The Soviet ICBMs are being replaced with the SS-27 Mod 
1 and the SS-27 Mod 2. The SS-27 Mod 1 is a single-warhead missile with either mobile or silo-
based capabilities, and the SS-27 Mod 2 is similar to the SS-27 Mod 1 except that it functions as 
a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) carrying multiple warheads on each 
missile.25 In addition, Russia has announced plans for road-mobile delivery systems and rail-
mobile ICBMs.26  
Second, Russia has announced the construction of eight Borei-class submarines that will 
gradually replace older Soviet vessels. Currently, the Russians have completed three of these new 
submarines with the rest of the vessels not scheduled for completion until the early to mid-2020s.27 
These new submarines will increase the capabilities of the Russian SLBM fleet through the 
introduction of the SS-N-32 Bulava SLBMs, which each carry six warheads, compared to three to 
four carried by current models.28 Finally, the Russians have focused on modernizations of the 
current Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS strategic bombers. It is estimated that Russia has 
completed the modernization of only seven strategic bombers out of an estimated total of sixty.29 
Russia has also started modernizing its NSNWs. Although only limited information on the 
modernization of NSNWs is currently available, it is known that Russia has planned the 
modernization of a variety of NSNWs including the construction of new nuclear attack missile 
submarines, aircraft, and short-range ballistic missiles.30 Unfortunately, the progress and cost 
estimates for these new capabilities are unknown. 
Low global oil prices and international sanctions have placed economic limitations on 
Russia’s nuclear modernization program. With roughly half of its government revenue stemming 
from the oil and gas sector, the Russian government has had substantial financial shortfalls with 
oil prices dropping as low as $34 per barrel in January 2016.31 Russian Finance Minister Anton 
                                                 
23 Kristensen, Hans M. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Federation of American Scientists, May 2012. 
24 Kristensen, Hans M. "Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?" Arms Control Association. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT (accessed 
February 22, 2016). 
25 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
71, no. 3 (November 27, 2015), http://thebulletin.org/2015/may/russian-nuclear-forces-20158299 (accessed 
February 27, 2016). 
26 "Sarmat." Missile Threat: A Project of the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes. 
http://missilethreat.com/missile-class/sarmat/ (accessed February 19, 2016). 
27 Kristensen, Hans M. "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016." FAS - Federation of American Scientists. 
http://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/04/russian-nuclear-forces-2016/ (accessed April 20, 2016). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Pifer, Steven. "Pay Attention, America: Russia is Upgrading its Military." The Brookings Institution. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/02/05-russian-military-modernization-us-response-pifer (accessed 
February 17, 2016). 
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Siluanov reflected on the severity of these shortfalls when he admitted that Russia’s modernization 
plan is “unaffordable.” These budget limitations are forcing tradeoffs between nuclear and 
conventional capabilities. Regarding the nuclear program, budget cuts have delayed plans to build 
a rail-based ICBM system, delayed the development of the new PAK-DA bomber until the early 
2020s (at the earliest), and have disrupted the construction of warships and submarines. Generally, 
these budget concerns indicate that Russia could struggle to achieve the full extent of its nuclear 
and even conventional modernizations in the immediate future. 
 
Russia’s Theory of Victory 
 
Russia’s theory of victory is focused on local and regional conflicts. It aims to solidify its 
sphere of influence, undermine NATO, and discredit U.S. commitments to Europe.32 An example 
of a scenario in which Russia might enact its theory of victory is the potential suppression a color 
revolution within a bordering country.33 It could use a combination of Special Forces, 
disinformation, and propaganda to repress a popular uprising and secure control of the country 
before NATO forces could react.34 NSNWs would play a large role in such a scenario, and Russia 
would likely be prepared to employ these weapons preemptively against incoming NATO forces 
to de-escalate any conflict.35 Such a decision would signal Russian resolve and alert U.S. and 
NATO decision-makers to the asymmetry of the stakes at play in the conflict. This calculus carries 
the assumption that the U.S. and NATO would not be willing to escalate the conflict over a territory 
in which it has much less interest than Russia. This could result in negotiations that favor Russian 
interests and discredit NATO. According to former DASD Brad Roberts, such a theory of victory 
is “instantiated in [Russian] doctrine and capabilities.”36 
 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN EUROPE 
Allies and Partners 
 
A major component of the U.S. extended deterrence (and assurance) posture in Europe is 
its leadership within the NATO alliance. Although originally founded to protect Western Europe 
from Soviet aggression during the Cold War, NATO expanded into Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
and 2000s with the addition of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States, among others. The most 
powerful assurance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of its NATO allies is Article V of the 
1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack on one NATO state is an attack against all 
NATO states.37  
 
Current Extended Deterrence Posture and Challenges 
 
                                                 
32 Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21St Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016, 
p. 131. 
33 Ibid, p. 133. 
34 Ibid, p. 133. 
35 Ibid, p. 134. 
36 Ibid, p. 136. 
37
 "The North Atlantic Treaty," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 21, 2016, accessed April 24, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 
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 Recent Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, especially the annexation of Crimea, have 
brought into question the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence posture, especially with 
Russia’s emphasis on NSNWs. To meet this growing Russian challenge, the U.S. has 160-200 
NSNWs and 62,000 conventional forces in Europe, levels far below those at the end of the Cold 
War.38 39 Significantly, the U.S. and NATO have actually minimized the role of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons within their national security strategies. Instead, the U.S. posture has emphasized 
conventional capabilities to reinforce deterrence against Russian forces, especially considering 
U.S. conventional superiority in technology, firepower, and accuracy.  
However, reductions in U.S. manpower have become an increasing concern for both U.S. 
and NATO military leaders. For example, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove 
urged Congress in February 2016 to consider reversing manpower cuts in the European theater 
specifically because of the “substantial increase in our deterrence and reassurance operations in 
response to Russian occupation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine.”40 The vast 
majority of the 62,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Western Europe only a fraction of U.S. forces 
and equipment are stationed in Eastern European states41. This posture emerges from the Founding 
Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security of 1997 between NATO and the Russian 
Federation in which both Russia and NATO agreed to avoid stationing large numbers of troops 
along borders shared by Russia and members of NATO.42 In the current European security 
environment, this presents a risk. Without Eastern stationed forces, Russia could move in Eastern 
Europe swiftly, and make significant geographical and political changes that the West would be 
forced to accept. Although it is far from certain that the Russians would attempt such an invasion 
of any NATO members, especially with its struggling economy, U.S. and allied NATO forces are 
extremely vulnerable at current levels of deployment, according to U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General Mark Milley.43 
To both bolster its deterrence posture and reassure allies in the region, the U.S. has taken 
several measures. First, it has bolstered its conventional presence in Eastern Europe, reversing 
reductions in U.S. tanks and aircraft in Germany and redeploying them on a rotational basis in 
Central and Eastern Europe.44 To further assure allies, the U.S. has increased the budget for 
military spending in Europe from $789 million to $3.4 billion in 2017 for a one-year period.45 
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Although these moves have received support from European allies, concerns remain about whether 
rotational deployments, rather than permanent commitments, do enough to reinforce deterrence. 
For example, Supreme Allied Commander Phillip Breedlove noted in his Congressional testimony 
in 2016 that “[a] temporary surge in rotational presence, for example, will not have lasting effect 
unless it is followed by the development and fielding of credible and persistent deterrent 
capabilities.”46  
Second, the United States has strengthened its missile defense posture in Europe. 
Deployments of missile defense technology include the stationing of the PATRIOT surface-to-air 
guided air and missile defense system in Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain.47 As of 
2015, the United States has deployed four ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships to Spain, 
which ostensibly adds another layer of missile defense in Europe.48 Furthermore, the U.S. has 
strengthened its missile defense capabilities in Eastern Europe through the construction of an Aegis 
ballistic missile defense site in Romania and is currently working on the construction of a sister 
base in Poland.49 To be clear, modern missile defense capabilities are designed to intercept only 
the limited number of missiles launched by states with limited nuclear arsenals, such as a duture 
Iran and North Korea; in fact, Russia would be able to overwhelm current missile defense 
capabilities. However, missile defense commitments, coupled with manpower reinforcements, 
have reinforced that the United States remains committed to the defense of its NATO allies in 
Eastern Europe. These commitments are critical considering recent estimates from the RAND 
Corporation that claim it would only take thirty-six to sixty hours for a Russian offensive to 
overwhelm the current defenses of the Baltic States.50 
 
OPTIONS 
 
Even though these conventional improvements are a step in the right direction, more could 
be done to strengthen the U.S. deterrence posture against Russia and further bolster the assurance 
of NATO allies. Furthermore, the U.S. could consider options to salvage areas of nuclear 
cooperation in the hopes of stabilizing relations in the long term. This report outlines three options:  
 
 Strengthen the U.S. Conventional Posture in Eastern Europe: Bolster U.S. conventional 
manpower and capabilities in Eastern Europe. 
 Overhaul U.S. NSNW Posture in Europe: Reemphasize NSNWs in U.S. and NATO 
security strategy and continue modernization programs  
 Confidence Building: Although the U.S. and Russia have many areas of substantive 
political disagreement, both could emphasize areas of mutual interest and build upon 
successful negotiations 
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Option #1: Focus on Conventional Improvements 
 
This option calls for the U.S. extended deterrence posture to focus squarely on 
improvements to conventional capabilities. This option explicitly rejects increasing the number of 
NSNWs in Europe or the prioritization of NSNWs in U.S. strategy. During the Cold War, the 
United States relied upon NSNWs as a response option to bridge the gap between conventional 
and strategic nuclear weapons. Today, however, conventional weapons have bridged the accuracy 
and firepower gaps that NSNWs were designed to address.51 Furthermore, increasing the number 
of deployed NSNWs provides little value-added as a deterrent because current U.S. nuclear 
doctrine strongly suggests that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in any situation 
less than an existential threat to the homeland or its allies.52 Instead, the United States ought to 
rely upon a variety of conventional improvements to improve its deterrence posture in Europe. 
These improvements significantly contribute to the U.S.’ ability to signal its commitment to NATO 
allies in Eastern Europe. 
First, the United States could bolster its advanced conventional capabilities that could serve 
as a counter to NSNWs. Already, advanced information technology and highly accurate sensors 
allow conventional cruise missiles to achieve powerful impact results with a high degree of 
accuracy.53 The United States could also continue to develop additional advanced conventional 
technologies that could serve as a deterrent to Russian NSNWs. These include Conventional 
Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities that would enable the United States to hit high-value 
targets anywhere in the globe in under an hour.54 Another example is the development of 
specifically conventional variants of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) that have the particular 
benefit of evading missile defenses to strike targets with great precision.55 The development of 
such technologies would send a message to the Russians that the United States would not require 
NSNWs to respond to a Russian provocation with precise, devastating force and raise the costs for 
Russia of initiating provocations. 
Second, under this option the U.S. would reverse its cuts in manpower in order to bolster 
its capabilities in Eastern Europe. The U.S. has already begun to take steps in this direction. The 
United States has recently implemented a one-year commitment to increase military spending in 
Europe from $789 million to $3.4 billion.56 However, under this option these changes would shift 
from rotational deployments to permanent commitments to NATO allies bordering Russia. 
Furthermore, the United States would preposition heavy equipment and supplies in Eastern 
European states. These adjustments would add further credibility to the quality of American 
extended assurance to NATO allies and demonstrate resolve to the Russians. 
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Third, the U.S. would consider the expansion of missile defense capabilities in Eastern 
Europe to provide further reassurance to allies. Current deployments of missile defense technology 
include the posting of the PATRIOT surface-to-air guided air and missile defense system in 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain and four ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis 
ships to Spain. In conjunction, the United States has expanded Aegis missile defense sites to 
Romania and Poland. The U.S. could also foster bilateral agreements to sell the Patriot air and 
missile defense to Eastern European allies outside of NATO agreements to bolster national defense 
in Eastern Europe.57 Furthermore, even for countries without American missile defense 
commitments, such as the Baltic States, the presence of missile defense in nearby states reinforces 
the strength of U.S. assurance in the region.  
     A key strength of this option is that it provides an explicit assurance of U.S. commitment 
to Eastern Europe. For example, forward deployment of capabilities and forces in Eastern Europe 
sends a demonstrable signal that an attack on the Baltics will directly involve the U.S. In a sense 
it creates a tripwire in the Easternmost NATO states, as a major ground assault will have to target 
U.S. positions. This trip-wiring in addition to the development of advanced conventional 
capabilities could convince the Russians that the costs of initiating a conflict would be too high. 
However, an important concern with this option is that the mobilization of U.S. 
conventional capability in Eastern Europe might further deepen Russia’s fears of NATO presence 
and further increase Russian dependence on NSNWs. Although Russia has emphasized NSNWs 
in its security doctrine, in practice, it has relied upon covert and conventional methods in its 
intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. The ramping up of U.S. conventional capability in Eastern 
Europe could convince Russia that it has to further expand and modernize its NSNW program in 
order to compensate for its growing conventional inferiority. Considering Russia’s economic 
struggles, the acceleration of a U.S. conventional presence in Eastern Europe could provoke an 
aggressive Russian response and serve as a catalyst for conflict. 
 
Option #2: Improve flexible response options, demonstrate nuclear risks 
 
This option rejects the assertion that the United States can deter the use of NSNW in Europe 
by Russia through conventional means in Europe. Russia has increased reliance on NSNW as a 
reaction to its conventional inferiority—not unlike U.S. strategic posture during the Cold War. 
Therefore it is logical to contend that Russia views its NSNW as beyond the threshold of 
conventional deterrence.  In the event of a Russian NSNW strike, it might also prove useful to give 
U.S. policymakers a wider range of options, rather than responding with only conventional 
capabilities or escalating to strategic nuclear strikes. 
With this in mind, the U.S. could consider a reemphasis of NSNWs in Europe in order to 
provide a clear deterrent to Russian NSNW capabilities. Broadly, this option calls for NATO’s 
security strategies to reverse discussions about minimizing the role of NSNWs in Europe and re-
center NATO’s deterrence posture on its NSNWs. Concerning capabilities, this option calls for the 
continuation of modernization programs for the U.S. NSNW arsenal in Europe. Of specific interest 
is the continuation of dial-a-yield weapons, or variable yield weapons, which provide a range of 
options that can be tailored to specific Russian provocations. This explicitly rejects calls from 
influential nuclear thinkers, such as former assistant secretary of defense Andrew C. Weber, that 
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this modernization is “unaffordable and unneeded” and ought to be reconsidered.58 Furthermore, 
the U.S. might consider the expansion of delivery vehicles for its NSNWs. Nuclear expert Matthew 
Kroenig argues that using bombers as the sole delivery vehicle for NSNWs creates risks to 
survivability in a conflict because of Russia’s air defenses.59 Thus, the U.S. could consider further 
improvements to the survivability of dual-capable aircraft while considering other launch options, 
such as sea-launched cruise missiles.60 
Most importantly, this option calls for the addition of nuclear scenarios into NATO military 
exercises. Russia has already done this, with one scenario playing out a nuclear attack on Poland. 
This would signal to Russia that nuclear weapons are still on the table, and if Russia crosses that 
threshold escalation is likely, generating greater risk for all involved. The U.S. does not need to 
believe a nuclear war is ‘winnable’; rather it should play on the fear of what a limited nuclear war 
would look like, and how it would end. 
The overall goals of this option are twofold—to deter the Russian threat in kind and to 
demonstrate to Russia that the costs of escalating to NSNW are exceedingly high. Whether 
conventional or NSNW, the United States would have a specific range of options to meet the 
Russian threat at every level of escalation. However the primary benefit of this option is that it 
would signal to the Russians that the U.S. is prepared to engage if the nuclear threshold is crossed, 
exponentially increasing the cost of attempting a limited nuclear attack. Additionally this option 
would assure European allies that the U.S. would not back down in the event of a conflict with 
Russia.  
     A major concern of this option is the idea that creating lower yield weapons increases the 
usability of these weapons in the midst of a crisis. This inherently creates escalatory risks. Second, 
it is unclear whether expanding the NSNW supply would provide any additional value for U.S. 
deterrence. The U.S. already has 160-200 NSNWs distributed throughout Europe, and it seems 
unlikely that Russia could credibly undermine the ability of the U.S. to use its NSNWs in a 
potential conflict. 
 
Option #3: Confidence Building 
 
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. and Russia improved the security of Russian military and 
civilian facilities and repatriated Russian origin Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactors from 
Central and Eastern Europe.61 Recently, however, U.S. and Russian policymakers have reduced 
nuclear cooperation programs because of broad political and security disagreements, especially 
the Russian annexation of Crimea. For example, the U.S. Congress prohibited the use of U.S. funds 
in Russia, which has precluded numerous areas of nuclear cooperation; likewise, Russia has 
informed the U.S. that it would reduce its participation in a joint campaign to secure nuclear 
material on Russian territory. Linking political and security disagreements to nuclear cooperation 
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is problematic because it eliminates areas of potential agreement between the U.S. and Russia that 
might exist otherwise. However there is room for cooperation through international institutions 
like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The U.S. could use opportunities within 
international frameworks to enhance mutual trust that will be vital to securing cooperation for an 
additional mutual reduction treaty after the expiration of New START in 2021. 
   The first step towards fostering a better relationship would be to address areas of mutual 
concern. While nuclear materials cooperation between the U.S. and Russia are all but shut down, 
both sides have common goals in this area, such as the repatriation of HEU fuels from Poland and 
Kazakhstan to Russia.62 Likewise, the U.S. and Russia could work to expand effort within the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an organization in which both the U.S. and Russia 
are founders and co-chairs. Building from small successes, the U.S. and Russia could outline 
concerns regarding each other’s security postures in Europe. For example, the U.S. could outline 
its concern regarding the obscurity of Russia’s NSNW arsenal, while Russia could express its 
concern regarding the expansion of NATO missile defense systems in Europe. Negotiations could 
then begin with a dialogue in which each side explains its concerns to the other. After these 
discussions, each side could offer gestures of good faith for the continuation of the negotiations. 
For example, the U.S. could publicly pledge to curb the expansion of missile defense in Europe. 
Likewise, Russia could offer limited information about its non-strategic weapons arsenal or issue 
public statements deemphasizing their role in Russian strategy. Although potential negotiations 
would take a great deal of time, U.S. and Russian negotiations have resulted in mutually beneficial 
outcomes even at times of great mistrust, as shown by U.S. and Soviet cooperation during the Cold 
War. 
One particular concern about a cooperation option is the message that it might send to allies 
in the region. For example, if the U.S. were willing to reduce its expansion of missile defense in 
Europe, it could generate questions about U.S. security commitment to allies. Furthermore, there 
are legitimate concerns from both the U.S. and Russia about whether it can negotiate with the other 
state in good faith. For example, the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty while 
the Russians have not fully honored their commitment within the Presidential Threat Initiative to 
reduce the number of NSNWs within their arsenal. 
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ASIA-PACIFIC 
 
China and North Korea feature prominently in U.S. regional concerns for the Asia-Pacific. 
Since the previous NPR, China has made substantive progress in its nuclear modernization and 
has implemented important shifts in its nuclear doctrine; North Korea has also made several 
improvements to its nuclear weapon’s arsenal and is continuing to develop its offensive and long-
range ballistic capabilities. It is important for the U.S. to determine the best way to deter both states 
from engaging in aggressive regional practices that infringe on the interests of the U.S. and its 
allies and partners. In the case of potential military escalation, particularly on the part of North 
Korea, it is vital that the U.S. consider the best options for extending deterrence and assuring its 
allies of U.S. commitment and resolve to defend their sovereignty.  
 
CHINA 
 
Although China has been a nuclear weapons state for decades, its historically stable nuclear 
arsenal and nuclear posture are changing. China is developing and modernizing its nuclear 
weapons, taking an increasingly assertive military posture in the Asia-Pacific, and even changing 
its nuclear policies. These developments are important, as they could significantly impact the 
interests of the U.S. and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
National Strategy 
 
From its inception, China’s nuclear weapons program has remained minimal. Chairman 
Mao and other founding Communist elites felt that simply having nuclear weapons was sufficient 
to deter other nuclear powers from attempting to coerce China. Therefore, China did not need to 
possess a huge arsenal like the U.S. or the Soviet Union. To this day, China still prioritizes the 
survivability of its arsenal over the number of weapons it has; however, recent changes in the 
nuclear command and control system and shifts in military rhetoric could indicate an important 
shift in this minimal deterrent posture. 
 
Developments and Capabilities 
 
China had approximately 260 nuclear weapons in 2015, according to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute.63 The quantity of its nuclear arsenal has remained relatively 
constant over the years, but it is slowly growing. In addition, China is actively upgrading nuclear 
warheads and delivery systems. It is estimated to have 160 land-based strategic ballistic missiles 
used as delivery vehicles, along with aircraft and a ballistic submarine fleet; it is also estimated 
that 45-60 of China’s inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can hit the United States.64 
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Analysts report China has approximately 150 non-strategic nuclear warheads on short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs); however, most of these are deployed near Taiwan.65  
 
Nuclear Modernization 
 
 The Chinese military has been working on substantial modernizations of its nuclear triad. 
First, China is upgrading its ICBMs. One key upgrade is the conversion of its single warhead 
missiles into multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), allowing them to carry 
multiple warheads on one missile.66 According to a 2015 Department of Defense report, a “new 
generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are 
intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in 
U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), 
precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.”67 This has serious national security implications 
for the U.S. because this means that more Chinese nuclear warheads could hit the American 
homeland.68 China, like Russia, is also working to improve the survivability of its ICBMs by 
making them mobile.69 This is intended to ensure that an adversary would be unable to guarantee 
that a preemptive strike could eliminate all of China’s nuclear weapons, strengthening China’s 
ability to retaliate.  
Second, China is continuing to work on making its submarine fleet capable of carrying 
nuclear warheads.70 Like mobile missiles, nuclear armed submarines also improve the survivability 
of China’s nuclear weapons and further secure its second strike capability. 
 Third, China is modernizing its bombers. Although China has reduced the total number of 
its bombers, it is steadily replacing older models with newer versions.71 Some of these newer 
versions are strategic bombers used for long-range and standoff attacks that carry land attack cruise 
missiles (LACMs), which could potentially carry a nuclear warhead.72  
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The New Rocket Force 
 
China recently restructured its military. Since 1966, the Second Artillery Force (SAF), a 
sub-branch under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was in charge of China’s land-based 
nuclear and conventional weapons. However, on December 31, 2015, President Xi Jinping 
announced that the new Rocket Force was to replace the previous SAF.73 Unlike the SAF, the 
Rocket Force is not a sub-branch under the PLA; it is its own branch in China’s military, like the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force.74 The Rocket Force will now control all nuclear and conventional 
ballistic and cruise missiles, not just land-based missiles. It is tasked with enhancing nuclear 
deterrence and counter-strike abilities, and ensuring they are credible and reliable.75  
This change appears to be a way to streamline command and give control directly to Xi 
under his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).76 Despite reassurances 
from Chinese officials, this change from the SAF to the Rocket Force should be carefully 
monitored. By taking out the middleman, namely the PLA, the nuclear arsenal comes under the 
direct control of the CMC, with a civilian political leader at its head. This falls in line with recent 
developments that indicate President Xi is rapidly moving to consolidate power within the PLA 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although it is unclear what the implications are of a 
civilian political leader consolidating control over China’s nuclear weapons, it is a historic shift 
from China’s previous policy and requires further study by U.S. security strategists.  
 
Changing the No First Use Policy 
 
 China’s No First Use (NFU) policy has been a “cornerstone of its nuclear policy” since it 
first developed its nuclear weapons program in the 1950s.77 However, in the last few years, China’s 
commitment to this policy has come into question, especially after it was not explicitly stated in 
the 2013 Defense White Paper.78 The 2015 Defense White Paper did reaffirm China’s NFU policy 
and stated that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was for “strategic deterrence and nuclear 
counterattack”, but the paper also said that China was interested in improving its “strategic early 
warning” system. This could be the first step towards moving towards a high alert posture, as 
putting weapons on high alert requires early warning of incoming attacks.79 Chinese nuclear 
weapons on high alert would be a significant shift in the strategic posture of the region as a whole, 
and could signal further destabilizing developments. 
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Weapons on High Alert  
 
China has historically kept its nuclear weapons off of high alert, unlike the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War and today.80 This means Chinese warheads are currently kept 
separate from the delivery vehicles. This ensures that a nuclear launch would take time to prepare, 
signaling that China does not intend to launch a first strike. However, Gregory Kulacki, the China 
Project Manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists, claims internal military dialogue, including 
speeches from officers and military texts, shows discussion of China moving its nuclear weapons 
to an alert posture.  
According to Kulacki’s documents, this change is happening because of concerns over the 
continued technological advancement and accuracy of U.S. nuclear weapons, high-precision 
conventional weapons, and missile defenses which lessen China’s credible second-strike 
capability. Further, America’s unwillingness to acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China 
leads China to believe the U.S. is seeking both nuclear superiority and to make itself invulnerable 
to a potential retaliatory strike from China.81 These documents show that the Chinese military 
believes putting its nuclear weapons on high alert would help to establish assured retaliation vis-
á-vis the U.S. and would make its nuclear deterrence posture more credible.  
China moving its nuclear weapons to high alert would be concerning to the U.S. because 
of the dangers of the early phase of this change. In the early deployment and operation phase of 
early warning systems, mistakes are especially likely to occur as the hardware is not yet reliable 
and procedures have not been perfected. A crisis situation would further increase these risks.82  
 
China’s Theory of Victory  
 
China’s theory of victory is centered on winning a future war without fighting a single 
battle, harkening back to Sun Tzu’s teachings in The Art of War. To do this, China uses its hard 
and soft power, such as economic and informational tools, to position itself in the region in a way 
that deters other states from acting against its interests.83 China’s greatest victory would be 
deterring the U.S. from intervening in a Chinese conflict in the Asia-Pacific. To do this, China has 
worked to attain credible strike capabilities for attacking an adversary at sea, put U.S. allies at risk, 
and made detailed plans about how to get the international community on its side during a conflict 
over sovereignty. If the U.S. were not successfully deterred, China would aim for a quick and 
decisive win in a short, limited war before the U.S. could engage. Overall, China’s theory of 
victory is successfully deterring other states’ from acting in a way that harms its own interests. 
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NORTH KOREA 
 
North Korea is the most volatile nuclear weapons state in the world today, and it is 
continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. North 
Korea’s improving technology and continued hostility to the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific 
make it imperative that the U.S. finds a way to credibly deter both conventional and nuclear attacks 
from North Korea. This section will examine North Korea’s nuclear strategy, developing 
capabilities, and theory of victory.  
 
 
 
National Strategy 
 
North Korea’s national strategy is difficult to assess, particularly given uncertainties about 
the growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces; however, its strategy is known to reflect 
five core principles: 1) the maintenance of the Kim family leadership; 2) elimination of all internal 
threats to the leadership; 3) deterrence of the United States and South Korea; 4) economic 
development of the nation; and 5) reunification of the Korean peninsula. The regime has moved 
forward with it weapons development despite continued isolation from the international 
community and crippling sanctions for developing its nuclear program because its nuclear 
capabilities and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are considered to be necessary tools 
to protect these interests. While North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is not as formalized or developed 
as other nuclear powers, at a minimum it is thought to be a strategy of deterrence. Much like the 
nuclear strategy of NATO against the Soviet Union, North Korea seeks to create an increasingly 
credible second-strike capability to deter aggression at the conventional and nuclear levels from 
superior opponents.84 However, given North Korea’s record of threatening statements directed at 
the U.S. and its allies, any significant improvements in North Korea’s offensive capabilities must 
be carefully examined. 
 
Developments and Capabilities 
 
Due to its deliberate opaqueness, accurately assessing the capabilities of North Korea’s 
nuclear arsenal is an inexact science. It is thought that North Korea currently possesses less than 
ten nuclear warheads, but the amount of fissile material it currently has or could produce is 
estimated to be enough to fuel 20-100 additional warheads by 2020.85 To date, North Korea has 
conducted four nuclear tests that have all been simple fission devices with relatively low yields.86 
On January 6, 2016, however, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and unlike the 
previous three, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully detonated its first hydrogen bomb. 
That claim has been met with international skepticism, as seismic evidence seems to indicate that 
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the yield of the detonated bomb was too small to have been a thermonuclear device.87 While it was 
unlikely a hydrogen bomb, it is worth noting that the yield of North Korea’s tests rose 
incrementally in the first three tests and the fourth produced roughly the same yield as the third 
test at an estimated 7-9 kilotons.88 Even though North Korea does not yet possess some of the 
capabilities it claims to have, it is clear its capabilities are growing. Indeed, developing its nuclear 
arsenal continues to be one of the main focuses for the regime today. 
North Korea also continues to make strides in expanding its missile program. Currently, 
North Korea is thought to possess an estimated 700-800 Soviet-designed ballistic missiles that are 
mostly short-range. A 2013 U.S. government report estimated that North Korea has also deployed 
small numbers of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (about 100 and fewer than 30, 
respectively) that could reach Japan, but the intermediate-range missiles have never been flight-
tested.89 While these missiles are capable of doing catastrophic damage within the region, most 
concerning for the U.S. is North Korea’s efforts to develop a reliable long-range ballistic missile 
capability.90 A key milestone would be for North Korea to develop a nuclear warhead that is 
“miniaturized” or able to mount on long-range ballistic missiles.91 In fact, a number of high-
ranking U.S. officials have claimed that North Korea has already achieved this feat. This includes 
USNORTHCOM commander Admiral William Gortney who stated that, “…we assess that…they 
have the weapons, and they have the ability to miniaturize those weapons, and they have the ability 
to put them on a rocket that can range the homelands.”92 Additionally, General Curtis Scaparrotti 
of U.S. Force Korea made a similar assessment stating that North Korea has, “…the capability to 
have miniaturized a device at this point, and they have the technology to potentially actually deliver 
what they say they have.”93 In support of this developing capability, North Korea launched its 
second satellite into space on February 7, 2016, in the wake of its January nuclear test. While 
Pyongyang claims these types of launches are a part of its right to have a peaceful space program, 
it was widely thought to be a thinly veiled excuse to conduct a long-range missile test. The rocket 
in question was an Unha-3, which is believed to be capable of reaching Alaska and perhaps Hawaii 
if modified to carry a warhead.94 
Also noteworthy are North Korea’s claims that it had successfully conducted its first two 
SLBM tests in May and December of 2015. International analysts, however, heavily disputed the 
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success of the claims and stated that any evidence of success was probably doctored.95 It is 
generally reported that the tests were not only unsuccessful but that it is evident that North Korea 
is far from possessing such a capability. While this means that a North Korean SLBM capability 
is not of immediate concern, the U.S. must remain wary that North Korea is actively pursuing these 
capabilities.96 North Korea appears to be determined to develop a more robust and survivable 
nuclear arsenal and has so far has been willing to bear whatever costs necessary to develop its 
nuclear program. So while a North Korean operational SLBM may not be feasible in the immediate 
future, its ability to develop such a capability in the long-term should not be underestimated. 
 
North Korea’s Theory of Victory  
 
Like Russia and China, North Korea is concerned with how to safeguard its national 
interests in the event of a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States. North Korea seems 
to seek an end to the U.S.’s aggressive regional policies (seen as hostile policies against the regime) 
by using its nuclear arsenal to threaten and provoke the U.S. This is part of a larger strategy of 
nuclear brinksmanship, in which North Korea must demonstrate that its nuclear threats are 
credible, while refraining from crossing a threshold at which the U.S. would feel compelled to 
retaliate with a nuclear strike.97 
The regime’s ultimate theory of victory is centered on quickly achieving decisive military 
goals (usually against South Korea) using conventional forces within a time-span that does not 
allow the U.S. to significantly intervene. The U.S. then is expected to accept the changed political 
situation in North Korea’s favor because a reversal of the fait accompli would carry unacceptably 
high costs to the U.S.98  
In the event of a direct military confrontation with the U.S., North Korea hopes that its 
nuclear capabilities will allow the conflict to quickly reach an unacceptable level of costs to the 
U.S. This could involve either the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons to attack U.S. military 
bases or allies in the Asia-Pacific or even credibly threaten to strike the U.S. homeland in the 
future. This would then force the U.S. to capitulate to the North Korean regime.99 To this end, 
North Korea relies heavily on nuclear blackmail and brinksmanship. Ultimately, a North Korean 
theory of victory involves the use of nuclear weapons to persuade Washington that any decision 
to intervene in North Korean military action, or to otherwise politically interfere with the North 
Korean regime, would result in unacceptably high costs and casualties to the U.S. and its allies.100 
 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
Allies and Partners 
 
                                                 
95 Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear 
Diplomacy, and Internal Situation. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013, p. 15. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Roberts, Brad, "On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense," IFRI: Proliferation Papers 50, 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf (accessed April 1, 2016). 
98 Roberts, Brad, 2015, "Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century," Universite Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, 
http://chairestrategique.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/chairestrategiesorbonne/conferences_2015/07-
2015/01_Brad_Roberts_-_Nuclear_Deterrence_in_the_21st_Century.pdf (accessed April 1, 2016). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
NPR Capstone  May 2016 
 
 27  
 Because regional security in the Asia-Pacific is maintained by bilateral alliances, rather 
than institutional collective defense mechanisms like NATO, it is worth examining the concerns 
facing key U.S. allies in the region. Each ally presents its own unique concerns that must be 
considered by the U.S. in order to achieve extended deterrence objectives in the region and prevent 
nuclear proliferation. 
 
South Korea 
 
The Korean Peninsula is one of the most hotly charged regions in Asia, and South Korea 
keenly feels its own vulnerability to a North Korean nuclear or conventional attack. But the North-
South tensions in the Korean Peninsula are not the only volatile factors in the region: Chinese 
interests in maintaining a buffer state between itself and a pro-U.S. ally, as well as Japan’s 
historical interest and misgivings about Korean reunification, both play a significant role in rising 
tensions in the region. 101 U.S.-South Korean bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War have 
become increasingly stable, with the establishment of formal processes for consultation and 
increased cooperation. However, they have also been accompanied by an increasingly unstable 
and volatile nuclear regime in North Korea. Uncertainty regarding U.S. commitment to extended 
deterrence to South Korea remains one of the main potential elements for nuclear escalation on the 
Korean Peninsula.102  
 
Japan 
 
Underlying tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, as well as China superseding Japan as the 
region's dominant economic powerhouse, have increasingly deteriorated Japan’s security 
environment.103 Japan maintains a policy of nuclear hedging: pursuing continued protection under 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while hedging against future uncertainties through the development of 
ballistic missile defenses and civilian nuclear power industry, while preserving the proliferation 
status quo.104 In addition, North Korea’s nuclear development has made Japan vulnerable to both 
conventional and nuclear first-strike attacks from Pyongyang. Long-term historical animosities 
between the two countries further amplify Japan as a potential first-strike target in addition to 
South Korea.105 Japan remains sensitive to any possibility of a weakening U.S. role in Asia and 
extended deterrence remains at the forefront of bilateral relations. Regionally, Japan plays an 
important role in maintaining perceptions of stability; it is generally considered to be a strong 
anchor, tying the U.S. to the region and balancing increasing Chinese influence.106 Should Japan 
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ever lose confidence in the U.S. nuclear security umbrella, estimates on how quickly Japan could 
develop its own nuclear arsenal are as short as within a year.107 Thus, Japan could credibly produce 
nuclear weapons if it loses confidence in U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. 
 
Current U.S. Posture Regarding Extended Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific 
 
The U.S. continues to view extended deterrence as a necessary component of its 
commitments to the Asia-Pacific. Because of this, the U.S. continues to enhance and modernize 
conventional military capabilities in Asia, even while cutting back on other aspects of the global 
U.S. military posture.108 The U.S. is also committed to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear 
triad for extended deterrence commitments and signaling purposes, although this signaling is likely 
to increasingly rely on heavy bombers and nuclear-capable fighter-bombers, rather than 
submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) or ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which have 
historically been the most active leg of the triad in the Asia-Pacific.109 From the U.S. perspective, 
dual-capable aircraft that are globally deployable are more effective forms of signaling than the 
SSBNs, as they allow a display of collective resolve with the U.S. acting jointly with allies against 
nuclear threats.110 It is unlikely that the U.S. will shift away from maintaining the triad in the near 
future, and U.S. regional allies in Asia continue to see the triad as vital to ongoing U.S. 
commitment to extended deterrence.111  
 
Challenges to the Current U.S. Nuclear Posture 
Mutual Vulnerability 
 
Whether or not to accept or acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China has been debated 
for many years now. Similar to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, accepting mutual 
vulnerability with China would mean accepting that the adversary has a secure second-strike 
capability and is not completely vulnerable to a preemptive strike. That the U.S. is vulnerable to 
China is not a new idea. A 2009 task force chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry 
and Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft concluded, “mutual vulnerability with 
China- like mutual vulnerability with Russia - is not a policy choice to be embraced or rejected, 
but rather a strategic fact to be managed with priority on strategic stability.112” Indeed, mutual 
vulnerability was a strategic fact over half a decade ago, however it is just recently that the U.S. 
has seriously started to consider accepting it. Both the U.S. and China have the capability to survive 
a preemptive strike and to order a second-strike retaliation. This makes it clear that the U.S. and 
China are indeed mutually vulnerable.  
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Despite this, the U.S. remains reluctant to publicly accept mutual vulnerability. Many in 
the U.S. claim that accepting vulnerability will lead to increased Chinese aggression in the region, 
as America’s hands will be tied. Admitting vulnerability, it is also argued, would make U.S. allies 
in the region nervous and they may start to question U.S. commitment. Others, however, strongly 
believe that admitting mutual vulnerability will lead to strategic stability with China, like it did 
with the Soviet Union. They argue that as long as America does not accept it, China will assume 
the U.S. is attempting to ensure its superiority, leading China to further develop its own nuclear 
program. Recent developments in China’s nuclear posture appear to lend credibility to the latter 
argument. 
 
Missile Defense Systems 
 
In the wake of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January of 2016 and its satellite launch 
in February, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to officially hold talks about deploying the Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which targets high-altitude missiles, to South 
Korea.113 This is for the stated purpose of protecting the South Koreans from an attack by North 
Korea. However, China is not convinced that the U.S. motivations of installing THAAD in South 
Korea are purely defensive and view it as a measure of Chinese containment in line with the 
broader American Rebalance to Asia policy. 114  
China’s concern over the THAAD is two-fold. First, it is concerned that the deployment at 
a base in South Korea would indicate further commitment to U.S. presence in the region, and could 
potentially lead to Japan employing similar missile defenses. Second, and more importantly, China 
is concerned about the technology contained within the THAAD systems, specifically the X-band 
radar. The X-band radar is designed to track incoming missiles, and has a range well beyond the 
Korean Peninsula that could reach China.115 Further, while the THAAD in South Korea would 
most likely be unable to stop a Chinese missile attack on the U.S. homeland, it could potentially 
give early tracking data to missile defenses in the U.S.116 This is seen as another sign that the U.S. 
will continue to refuse mutual vulnerability with China. The Pentagon has tried to ease Chinese 
concerns, stating a missile defense system in South Korea "would be focused solely on North 
Korea" and that they “don't believe that it should pose any sort of concern to the Chinese"; 
However, China remains uneasy despite these assurances.  
 
Denuclearization as THE Endgame 
 
The singular endgame for the U.S. regarding North Korea’s nuclear program has always 
been denuclearization. To this end, the U.S. has refused to recognize North Korea as a nuclear 
weapons state and refuses to do so for the foreseeable future. In its many attempts to see this 
resolution come to fruition, the U.S. has deployed an array of strategies for over three decades, 
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including a mix of cooperative (roughly $400 million in energy aid) and coercive strategies 
(stringent international sanctions) without success in permanently stopping the progress of North 
Korea’s nuclear program. Now that it is clear that North Korea possesses nuclear capabilities and 
is intent on expanding its program, the U.S. may soon have to explore the suitability of other 
endgames, such as accepting the North as a de facto nuclear state. 
While preventing nuclear proliferation is a worthy policy that the U.S. should continue to 
pursue, it may have to consider that a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a rogue 
action or an arbitrary defiance of international norms, but that it can in fact be a rational decision. 
As it relates to North Korea specifically, nuclear weapons are seen as a genuine component of its 
national security and regime survival. Consider the fact that in the last two and a half decades, 
North Korea has seen one of its historical benefactors disappear when the Soviet Union dissolved 
in 1991, and watched South Korea emerge as a prosperous society that is economically and 
conventionally superior. It was also placed on George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” list along with 
Iran and Iraq and soon thereafter witnessed what happened to Saddam Hussein’s regime. Then it 
saw Muammar Gaddafi regime’s fall in Libya, even after it had given up its nuclear ambitions in 
exchange for sanctions relief. From this perspective, North Korea’s belief that its national security 
is in jeopardy is not entirely unreasonable. This in no way absolves North Korea of its 
provocations, its atrocious human rights record, nor is it meant to lay blame on the U.S. for making 
North Korea feel insecure. Instead, it is to simply recognize that the United States might have to 
reconsider diverging from the singular negotiation position of denuclearization if North Korean 
leaders perceive nuclear weapons as so pivotal to regime survival.  
 
 
Options for Extended Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific 
 
 Extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific faces developing challenges in the resurgence of 
China and the development of a North Korean nuclear arsenal. In addition, the extension of 
deterrence through bilateral relations in Asia further complicates the U.S.’ ability to demonstrate 
commitment and assure its allies. Because of this, there are three options that the U.S. could 
consider to address extended deterrence challenges in the changing security environment of the 
Asia-Pacific. 
 
 Broaden and Develop Forward Posture: Counter Chinese and North Korean actions 
aggressively with the intent of assuring U.S. allies. 
 Assume an Accommodating Posture: Address Chinese and North Korean actions through 
diplomatic approach with the intent of decreasing tensions in the region. 
 Maintain a Mixed Approach: Address Chinese and North Korean with increase military 
presence while fostering and enhancing bilateral and multilateral agreements in the region 
to decrease tensions in the region at the same time. 
 
Option #1: Broaden Forward Posture 
 
     This option would strengthen the U.S. conventional posture in the Asia-Pacific with the 
objective of bolstering American assurances to its allies and partners in the region. There are four 
steps to this approach. First, the U.S. would not recognize mutual vulnerability with China. 
Second, it would deploy the THAAD to South Korea. Third, it would refuse to negotiate with 
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North Korea on anything less than denuclearization. And fourth, it would increase U.S. 
conventional presence in the region. 
The strength of this approach is that it would show that China and North Korea cannot 
leverage their nuclear weapons to pressure the U.S. into adjusting its posture to be favorable to 
them. Deploying the THAAD specifically shows that the U.S. will not allow China to influence 
the American security posture in the Asia-Pacific. Further increasing the U.S. presence in the 
region, perhaps by negotiating for U.S. bases in India and Vietnam, would demonstrate strong U.S. 
commitment to the region.  
The weakness to this approach is that, while assuring U.S. allies, it could raise tensions in 
the region even further. Previous U.S. actions led to the creation of China’s nuclear program and 
its military modernization of the last two decades. Therefore, instead of deterring China and North 
Korea, an aggressive U.S. posture could cause them to become more belligerent in the future and 
hurt U.S. allies, exactly what the posture was attempting to prevent. 
 
Option #2: Assume Accommodating Posture 
 
     The more moderate option would focus on decreasing tensions in the region with the aim 
to increase regional security and stability. It would achieve this through a four-step approach. First, 
it would accept mutual vulnerability with China. Second, it would not deploy the THAAD to South 
Korea. Third, the U.S. would accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. And fourth, it would 
decrease the U.S. conventional presence in the region.  
The strength of this approach is that accepting mutual vulnerability could eliminate the 
ambiguity of the U.S. position regarding this issue, allowing China to feel more secure. This in 
turn could lead China to slow down or stop its modernization programs, as this ambiguity has been 
a justification for China’s nuclear modernization in recent years. Furthermore, reducing U.S. 
conventional presence and rejecting the deployment of THAAD could improve relations with 
China because it shows that the U.S. is not pursuing a policy of encirclement against China.  
The weakness of this option is that it would most likely backfire regarding North Korea, 
as the leadership could see it as weak, prompting them to push for more concessions.  It could also 
weaken the U.S. assurance posture since allies could view U.S. concessions as a result of 
successful North Korea coercion. If U.S. allies are not confident in the U.S. commitment to their 
security, they could take steps to ensure their own security, perhaps by building their own nuclear 
weapons. 
 
Option #3: Maintain Mixed Approach 
 
    This proposed mixed approach would work to assure U.S. allies of its commitment to their 
security while also trying to decrease tensions in the region. It would do this through a different 
four-step approach. First, it would accept mutual vulnerability with China. Second, it would deploy 
the THAAD to South Korea. Third, it would refuse to negotiate with North Korea on anything less 
than denuclearization. And fourth, it would keep the U.S. conventional presence in the region, but 
without expanding to more foreign bases.  
 The strength of this approach is that it tries to incorporate the best of the other two 
approaches: it would work to allay Chinese insecurity while still assuring U.S. allies and holding 
firm against North Korea’s nuclear program. If successful, it would be the best of both worlds. The 
U.S. would keep its traditional bases in Japan and South Korea and new bases in Australia and the 
Philippines, but it would not seek more foreign bases. This would make China feel less vulnerable, 
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but the U.S. would also be able to demonstrate ongoing commitment to its allies. By deploying the 
THAAD to South Korea and not negotiating with North Korea regarding anything other than 
denuclearization, the U.S. would also show it cannot be unduly influenced into acting against its 
interests. 
 The weakness of maintaining a mixed approach is that it seems to be reacting to specific 
components differently and not as an overall cohesive posture. For instance China might view the 
U.S. accepting mutual vulnerability and then turning around and deploying the THAAD to South 
Korea as contradicting signals. This posture could be viewed as inconsistent and confusing for 
both adversaries and allies in the region.  
 
MIDDLE EAST 
IRAN 
 
 Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been a persistent national security challenge. 
With the development of its nuclear and missile programs, Iran has become a chief concern for 
American foreign policy. The U.S. and its regional allies have feared that a nuclear-armed Iran 
would become emboldened and would seek to further assert itself throughout the region. The U.S. 
has also feared that if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, it would result in a regional nuclear 
arms race. In an effort to prevent Iran’s nuclear program from going further and to assuage its 
regional allies, the U.S. was a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark 
deal to significantly reduce Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon.  Despite this deal, 
concerns remain. With conflicting interests on nearly every other issue, U.S.-Iranian relations have 
more or less stagnated. At the same time, U.S. regional allies fear that the deal will bring about an 
U.S. rapprochement with Iran, leading the U.S. to commit less to the security of its allies. Going 
forward, the U.S. will have to balance its efforts to cooperate with Iran with continual assurances 
to its allies that it is committed to their protection. Furthermore, the U.S. will have to contend with 
the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran is still possible in the future. 
 
National Strategy 
 
 Iran’s regime seeks to preserve its control over the state and to expand its power and 
influence throughout the Middle East while attempting to weaken and exclude the U.S. from the 
region. Tehran also seeks to project power throughout the Middle East and to defend Shias in other 
Sunni-ruled Gulf countries. Consequently, Iran’s relations with several Sunni-Arab states threaten 
the stability of the region as Iran seeks to challenge the status quo and acquire the power and 
prestige it feels it deserves. This has materialized in missile programs, defiance of the IAEA, and 
the support of proxies throughout the Middle East.117  
 
Developments and Capabilities 
 
Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons. However, before the signing of the 
JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear program was developing at an alarming rate. In 2010, it was discovered 
that Iran had been enriching large sums of uranium of up to 20 percent U-235, which could have 
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then been further enriched to weapons-grade uranium. Iran’s progress was so substantial that it 
had already produced enough U-235 to fuel a number of nuclear weapons. Its break out time was 
estimated as low as 2-3 months. However, Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA has greatly reduced 
its enrichment capabilities by severely limiting the size of its stockpile, in addition to putting limits 
on the technology necessary for enrichment. Assuming that Iran will remain compliant, its nuclear 
capabilities will be restricted for at least the next fifteen years.  
Although Iran’s nuclear capabilities are forestalled for the near future, Iranian missile 
capabilities are still considered to be extensive and robust. Tehran is known to possess an assorted 
variety of ballistic and cruise missiles of various sizes and ranges. According to one report, “Iran’s 
forces range from relatively short-range artillery rockets…to long-range missiles that can reach 
any target in the region and the development of booster systems that might give Iran the ability to 
strike at targets throughout.”118 Its shorter-range rockets are not considered to be of much utility 
outside of thwarting a direct invasion, however if these rockets are provided to groups like Hamas 
and Hezbollah, Iran would be able to indirectly attack Israel and project its power throughout the 
region.119 Iran is also known to possess an abundant amount of medium range ballistic missiles 
(MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). Although there is uncertainty about 
their numbers, accuracy, and ranges, it is estimated that its various missiles likely range from about 
2,000-5,000 kilometers.120 This means that Iranian missiles could reach potential targets 
throughout the Gulf, the entirety of Israel, and even parts of Europe. Finally, Iran is not thought to 
currently possess ICBM capabilities, but there are concerns about its proven capability to 
successfully launch multiple satellites into space. While there hasn’t been any indication that it has 
made efforts to develop ICBMs, satellite launch capabilities could potentially be utilized to 
develop ICBMs in the future.121  
 
Iran’s Theory of Victory 
 
Iran does not have a nuclear weapons capability to deter the U.S. in the event of a conflict 
and is incapable of defeating U.S. forces in a conventional war. The combined forces of the U.S. 
and regional allies outmatch Iran’s navy and air forces. Therefore, Iran is forced to find other 
means to safeguard its interests. Currently, Iranian strategy is to utilize its missile forces to impose 
attritional costs on the U.S. and its regional allies in a ‘war of intimidation’. In such a conflict, Iran 
would launch its missiles in a series of volleys or salvos in the general direction of population 
centers and military installations.122 While Iran’s missiles are not believed to be overly accurate, 
the psychological impact of such launches could be enormous.123 The fear of unannounced 
barrages over a number of days could so disrupt operations or damage military and infrastructure 
facilities long enough to have a significant political impact. Even before the outbreak of war, Iran’s 
ability to launch a large volume of missiles over a period of days with little warning gives Iran 
leverage and makes such missiles a weapon of intimidation.124 Importantly, this ‘war of 
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intimidation’ strategy allows Iran to achieve its political aims without directly confronting the U.S. 
or allied forces.  
 The U.S. must also consider Iran’s theory of victory if it ever does obtain nuclear weapons 
capability. It is difficult to predict how aggressive Iran would become in exploiting its nuclear 
capability if it did acquire nuclear-armed missiles. Iran has so far been cautious in initiating any 
use of force that might threaten the survival of the regime. Its best strategy would be to limit its 
use of nuclear missile forces to pressure, deter, and intimidate. It is highly unlikely that the Iranian 
regime plans to actually use a nuclear weapon in an offensive attack. Both of the obvious targets, 
the United States and Israel, have a second-strike nuclear arsenal capable of threatening the 
regime’s survival. However, nuclear weapons could deter foreign military strikes against the 
Iranian homeland, making the Iran’s use of conventional military force abroad less risky.125 
 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
As in Europe and Northeast Asia, the U.S. is committed to the protection of numerous 
allies and interests in the Middle East. As it relates specifically to Iran, the U.S. has a vested interest 
in the protection of the six Gulf States that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These 
states are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Due to a 
number of religious, cultural, and political differences, the members of the GCC have long had an 
adversarial relationship with Iran and believe that it actively works to destabilize their monarchies 
and seeks regional hegemony. Although the U.S. is not formally committed to their defense, its 
informal commitments are readily apparent. The U.S. stations over 20,000 troops throughout GCC 
territories; most prominent is the headquarters of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. In addition, 
the U.S. has conducted dozens of bilateral and multilateral joint-military exercises, sold hundreds 
of American aircraft and a number of THAAD missile defense systems to GCC members, and 
signed arms deals worth billions of dollars, including a $60 billion deal with Saudi Arabia in 
2010.126 Furthermore, President Obama hosted a summit in May of 2015 for the GCC leaders to 
further assure them of American commitment in the midst of American negotiations with Iran over 
its nuclear program. At the conclusion of the summit, a joint statement read that the leaders of the 
U.S. and the GCC,  
“…Underscored their mutual commitment to a U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to 
build closer relations in all fields, including defense and security cooperation…and 
to deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners. In the event 
of such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States stands 
ready…for the defense of our GCC partners.”127  
Given these assurances, it is likely that the U.S. would come to the defense of GCC member states 
in the event of a conflict with Iran, even if it were not formally obliged to do so.  
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OPTIONS 
 
 Although Iran does not currently possess its own nuclear arsenal, and is theoretically 
prevented from doing so in the immediate future, it still significantly impacts U.S. nuclear posture 
in the Middle East. Because of this, there are three options that the U.S. could pursue to continue 
to deter Iranian aggression and persuade Iran to adhere to the terms of the JCPOA. 
 
 Extend the Nuclear Umbrella over the GCC: Signal to Iran and to the GCC that Iran will 
not be able to credibly threaten nuclear usage against the GCC. 
 Ensure Effective Implementation of the JCPOA: Work with international organizations and 
individual countries (specifically, China and Russia) to enforce snapback sanctions if Iran 
is found noncompliant 
 Incorporate Iran into Global Nuclear Security Discussions: Invite Iran into the global 
community and provide Tehran with more opportunities to interact with potential partners. 
 
Option #1: Extend the Nuclear Umbrella over the GCC 
 
 No member of the GCC currently possesses nuclear weapons; and a nuclear-armed Iran 
may be able to threaten, intimidate, and push its regional interests in a way that they would be 
unable to counter. In turn, there is an ongoing debate that that a nuclear-capable Iran might trigger 
a sort of nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf as the GCC would look to counter the Iranian 
threat.128 This is of particular concern regarding Saudi Arabia, whose wealth and struggle for 
regional dominance provides it with strong incentives to counter an Iranian nuclear threat with a 
nuclear capability of its own. To assuage these fears, it is in U.S. interests to consider opening up 
a nuclear umbrella to the GCC territories.  
Similar to the one extended in Northeast Asia, a nuclear umbrella for the Gulf States would 
serve two primary functions. The first is that it would deter Iran from threatening nuclear use 
against the GCC. With a nuclear umbrella over the GCC, the U.S. signals to both Iran and the GCC 
that Iran will never be able to actually use its nuclear weapons without a significant response from 
the U.S. The second benefit is that by assuring the GCC that the U.S. is committed to their 
protection, it reduces the need for them to produce their own nuclear weapons. In turn, this greatly 
diminishes the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the region.  
A significant weakness of this option is that the U.S. would likely have to create a more 
formal security relationship with the GCC and as it stands today, the GCC is ill prepared to create 
such a formal structure. Extending a formal U.S. security umbrella over the Gulf would require 
guarantees in the form of defense pacts with GCC states, or with the GCC as a whole, which would 
likely have mutual or collective self-defense provisions.129 For multilateral defense organizations 
to be effective, they require close integration among the members. However, there are currently 
substantial impediments to further integration. The primary concern is that the majority of the 
military capabilities of GCC states belong to Saudi Arabia, and because many member states are 
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wary of Saudi domination, they may be reluctant to entrust their future security to a Saudi-
dominated regional body. In 2010, Saudi Arabia alone accounted for nearly 40 percent of total 
military expenditures for the Middle East region and also accounted for approximately two-thirds 
of the GCC’s total active duty military forces, along with nearly half of its combat capable 
aircraft.130 Understandably, other Gulf States may fear that any truly integrated regional defense 
organization will be dominated by Saudi Arabia, and have thus far resisted Riyadh’s efforts to 
more tightly integrate the GCC.131  
 
Option #2: Ensure Effective Implementation of the JCPOA 
 
The JCPOA is intended to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program can only be used for purely 
peaceful purposes and does not produce a nuclear weapon. Of course, it is within the U.S.’ best 
interests to ensure that the JCPOA is effectively implemented. To ensure this effective 
implementation, the JCPOA includes a number of rewards for Tehran’s compliance to the deal and 
a number of provisions to punish Tehran if it is found to be noncompliant.  
The first step to assuring Iran’s compliance to the JCPOA is to reward Iran for its 
cooperation. In exchange for Iranian cooperation, the U.S., European Union (EU), and United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift the broad sanctions that had been applied to Iran 
for years. For its part, the U.S. agreed to allow the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related 
parts and services, to cease its efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, and to terminate a number 
of Executive Orders that had forbidden transactions with Iran’s financial institutions.132 The EU 
agreed to lift a number of similar sanctions that had targeted Iran’s oil and gas, precious metal, 
shipping, and banking sectors.133 These sanctions were lifted “simultaneously with the IAEA-
verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran.”134 Finally, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 2231 which served as the UNSC’s formal endorsement of the JCPOA. Importantly, it 
also terminated the six previous UNSC resolutions that had severely sanctioned Iran for its nuclear 
and ballistic missile program.135 While the implementation of the JCPOA is still in its early stages, 
it is important to note that Iran has thus far been compliant. On December 28, 2015, Iran completed 
one of the deal’s first requirements when it shipped 25,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium to 
Russia. This step alone is believed to have automatically increased Iran’s “breakout time” to twelve 
months or more.136 
The second step to assuring Iran’s compliance to the JCPOA is to punish Iran if it is found 
to be noncompliant with the deal. The JCPOA contains a number of verification measures that are 
designed to quickly detect an Iranian attempt to “break out”—covertly or otherwise—and build a 
nuclear weapon. In addition to increasing the number of inspectors in Iran, the JCPOA dictates 
that the IAEA will also monitor the stored Iranian centrifuges and related infrastructure for fifteen 
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years and will be permitted to monitor its uranium mills for up to twenty-five years.137 Critically, 
Iran also pledged to implement the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. The 
Protocol provides the IAEA with additional verification measures that allow it to have broader 
access into Iran’s nuclear program including increased physical access for the IAEA and improved 
administrative arrangements.138 There are also a number of provisions in place that allow the IAEA 
to bring forward any suspicions or questions it might have related to Iran’s undeclared facilities. 
According to one report,  
“If the agency has concerns about a particular site, the agency will provide Iran with the 
reasons for its concerns…Iran must then respond to the IAEA’s request… If the 
explanation does not satisfy the IAEA, it can request access to the site. Iran can take some 
steps to protect sensitive information if, for instance, the inspection is on a military facility. 
But ultimately, it is up to the IAEA to determine if the access is sufficient.”139  
In the event of the IAEA determining that the provided access is insufficient, there are measures 
in place to resolve the dispute. In particular, if a dispute cannot be resolved between the two alone 
then the JCPOA’s Joint Commission, a body of representatives from each of the P5+1 states and 
Iran, would be consulted. The consultation will help advise each party on how to settle the issue 
and will inherently bring any suspicious activity to the UNSC’s attention. In the event that Iran is 
then found to be non-compliant, the UNSC resolutions that had been lifted by UNSC Resolution 
2231 would be re-imposed or ‘snapped-back’ into place.140  
Although the incentives and punishments of the JCPOA are clearly outlined by the 
agreement, the U.S. could take three steps to further strength compliance with the agreement. First, 
the U.S. could work with other P5+1 actors to ensure that no major international actor aids Iran in 
breaking the agreement. For example, the U.S. could consider discussions with Russia and China 
reinforcing the importance of limiting arms sales to Iran if it is found to violate the agreement; 
likewise, the U.S. should consider discussions with the EU about preparations for diversifying its 
oil and natural gas supplies, if sanctions against Iran must be implemented again. Second, the U.S. 
could threaten to unilaterally re-impose sanctions against both U.S. and foreign companies with 
U.S. assets that transact with Iran. Although these measures acknowledge that the U.S. ability to 
unilaterally punish Iran through financial measures has limitations, the re-imposition of U.S. 
sanctions alone can still have a substantial financial impact on Iran’s economy. Third, if Iran does 
not comply with the JCPOA and aggressively pursues its nuclear program, the U.S. could publicly 
justify a military response to Iran’s international defiance. 
 
Option #3: Incorporate Iran into Global Nuclear Security Discussions 
 
 While the JCPOA is set up to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons for a number 
of years, it also recognizes Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program. This means that Iran will be 
allowed to maintain its nuclear infrastructure and a limited supply of nuclear materials. This fact 
alone makes Iran a permanent player in nuclear security issues. If Iran ever acquires nuclear 
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weapons, its role as a nuclear player would become more significant. Therefore, another option is 
for the U.S. to consider incorporating Iran into the various international summits, forums, and 
institutions that are routinely held to help promote international cooperation, enhance dialogue, 
and exchange ideas on nuclear security issues.  
Bringing Iran into the international dialogue on nuclear security has two primary 
advantages. The first advantage is that it provides Iran with more opportunities to exchange ideas 
with the international community and bolster cooperation. Theoretically, the more Iran participates 
in such international summits and forums and is able to interact with the international community, 
the more each side will understand one another.141 This understanding is fundamental to building 
mutual trust. Ultimately the aim is to help Iran to become a responsible stakeholder in global 
nuclear security. By building ties with members of the nuclear security community, Iran could be 
persuaded to adhere to established international laws and norms and may less likely to continue to 
pursue weapons or to use nuclear weapons for anything short of existential defense.  
The second advantage to this option is that it allows Iran to discuss nuclear issues without 
having to work directly with the U.S. Despite significant cooperation in implementing the JCPOA, 
Iran still views the U.S. as a hostile foreign power. Shortly after the JCPOA was signed, Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei explicitly stated that, “Even after this deal our policy 
towards the arrogant U.S. will not change. We don’t have any negotiations or deal with the U.S. 
on different issues in the world or the region.”142 However, if Iran is invited to participate in 
international forums and summits, the U.S. and Iran could perhaps find opportunities to discuss 
nuclear-related issues on a multilateral basis, allowing Iranian leadership to maintain the narrative 
with domestic audiences that it is not working directly with the United States.  
However, there is a glaring weakness to this option. Despite Iran’s historic cooperation in 
previous nuclear-related institutions, this did not stop Tehran from dismissing international norms 
and behavior when it originally decided to develop its nuclear program. Most notably, Iran is a 
participant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been since it signed and ratified 
the NPT by February of 1970.143 Unsurprisingly, Iran was found to be noncompliant with the 
NPT’s safeguards obligations in 2003, and continued to be noncompliant until the recently agreed 
upon JCPOA in 2015.144 This demonstrates the risk of assuming that participation in well-regarded 
international institutions will naturally result in trust building and compliance with international 
norms for nuclear security and nonproliferation.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 Changes in the global security environment demonstrate that state-based strategic threats 
continue to dominate U.S. security strategy and extended deterrence concerns. An increasingly 
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assertive Russia and China, and emerging nuclear capable states like North Korea all pose unique 
extended deterrence challenges that must be addressed by future administrations. In addition, the 
case of Iran demonstrates that nuclear proliferation continues to present a very real threat to the 
security environment of U.S. allies throughout the world. Because of this, there are a number of 
concluding policy options that the U.S. could consider when framing its overarching nuclear 
posture and strategy going forward. 
  
U.S. Response/ Modernization 
 
     Modernization of the nuclear triad is an urgent concern for U.S. national security, 
considering parts of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are already beyond their intended service lives. As 
detailed previously, both China and especially Russia have performed substantial modernizations 
to their nuclear arsenals. If the United States considers the modernization of the entire triad as 
essential to deter evolving capabilities from China and Russia, it will have to absorb a considerable 
financial cost. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that it will cost a total of $160 
billion to modernize the triad and associated nuclear weapons between 2015-2024.145 The specific 
costs to upgrade SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers are, respectively, $83 billion, $26 billion, and $40 
billion in the next decade.146 More comprehensive estimates increase the projected numbers up to 
$348 billion within the next decade for the following items: 1) strategic nuclear delivery systems 
and weapons ($160 billion); 2) non-strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons ($8 billion); 
3) nuclear weapons laboratories and their supporting activities ($79 billion); 4) nuclear-related 
command, control, communications, and early-warning systems ($52 billion).147Furthermore, the 
total cost of modernizing the triad, in conjunction with funding for nuclear weapons research and 
improvements in nuclear command and control, could exceed $1 trillion in the next three 
decades.148 This means that it is important to assess and prioritize modernization, and balance the 
costs of modernization against the nuclear capabilities of peer competitors such as Russia.  
 
 Recommendation/Option: Modernize All Three Legs 
    Since 2010, Russia has made substantial commitments to modernize all three legs of its 
nuclear triad. It plans to deploy road mobile ICBMs with multiple warheads, develop a new class 
of nuclear-capable subsonic bombers known as the PAK-DA, and has already begun the 
production of the new Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic submarine.149 Ultimately, the 
motivation behind the Russian modernization is that a robust strategic nuclear force ensures 
Russia’s status as a great power and ensures its security vis-à-vis the United States.150 Russia’s 
modernizations have established an advanced nuclear force. Reacting to this, USSTRATCOM 
commander Admiral Cecil Haney called for U.S. modernization stating, “We are fast approaching 
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the point where [failing to modernize these elements] will put at risk our safe, secure and effective 
and ready nuclear deterrent, potentially jeopardizing strategic stability.”151  
Although Chinese strategic forces remain smaller and of much less influence on the U.S. 
strategic nuclear posture than those of Russia, China is also undertaking substantive 
modernizations to its ICBM arsenal and is further advancing its submarine fleet toward nuclear 
capability. These developments indicate that the U.S. should remain committed to modernizing all 
three legs of its nuclear triad in order to maintain strategic stability and parity with Russian 
capabilities. 
Even though modernization of the U.S. triad is already underway, it is important to consider 
the priority in which the U.S. modernizes each leg of the triad. Modernization is an expensive and 
time-consuming endeavor, and it is important that the U.S. prioritizes its modernization efforts so 
that it avoids the risk of delays or even cancellations because of future budget changes. The United 
States must first prioritize the modernization of its aging nuclear bomber fleet with the research, 
development, and production of the long-range penetrating LRS-B bomber and the continual 
modernization of the current B-2 and B-52 fleet to meet evolving capabilities.152 Forward deployed 
in Europe or even the Asia-Pacific, modernized bombers could prove particularly useful as a strong 
symbol of assurance to allies. Second, the U.S. should prioritize the modernization of its submarine 
fleet with the production of the SSBN (X) submarines. These submarines will feature a variety of 
upgrades that will enable them to remain the most secure component of the U.S. secure second-
strike guarantee; for example, these submarines will be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion 
train, unlike current models, which will ensure improved stealth capabilities.153 Third, the U.S. 
must upgrade its ICBM arsenal. Improving command and control capabilities and replacing the 
older W78 warheads with newer, more powerful W87 warheads, will help ensure that Russian or 
Chinese improvements in their ICBMs will not challenge U.S. capabilities.154  
Although this report calls for modernization priorities, it also advocates retaining and 
eventually modernizing all three legs of the triads. SLBMs remain a crucial part of the arsenal 
because of their survivability, while bombers are useful for signaling because of the ability of 
commanders to recall them at the last moment. Retaining both SLBMs and bombers has received 
relatively little resistance in U.S. security policy. However, there remains a substantial debate on 
the necessity of the ICBM as a part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Former Secretary of Defense 
William Perry and others argue that the improved accuracy of SLBMs have eliminated the 
necessity for ICBMs.155 However, there are also arguments in favor of retaining ICBMs. The 
presence of ICBMs adds to the security of the U.S. homeland and central deterrence by making it 
nearly impossible for any adversary to take out all U.S. nuclear weapons in a splendid first strike. 
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With its silos hardened against nuclear blasts, an attacker would have to multiple warheads against 
each silo to ensure its destruction, which adds a further layer of security to the U.S. secure second-
strike posture. 
To counter Russian modernization of its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, the U.S. should, in 
turn, upgrade its gravity bombs and non-strategic aircraft. Modernization of the B61-12 gravity 
bomb will allow U.S. forces to strike targets more effectively and provide options for lower yields 
to reduce collateral damage. Concerning non-strategic aircraft, nuclear scholar Matthew Kroenig 
argues that current bomber capabilities could not reach Eastern Europe without refueling; 
furthermore, they would face stiff odds of penetrating Russian air defenses.156 Thus, the non-
strategic aircraft modernization should focus on modernizations of the existing B-52 fleet in the 
near term and focus on the development of the new LRS-B, which has a longer range and better 
penetration ability.157  
 
Broader Strategic Messaging and Global Zero 
 
Despite the increasing roles for conventional weapons in U.S. nuclear deterrence and 
planning, the United States should reconsider promoting nuclear abolition within its strategic 
documents. Achieving a “global zero” in nuclear weapons is highlighted in the 2010 NPR.158 
However, the practicality of achieving global zero continues to be debated, particularly in 
deterrence literature. The key question is the possibility of replacing nuclear extended deterrence 
with conventional deterrence. The U.S. commitment to a global zero appears to be more of a “you 
first” policy than it is an initiative spearheaded by U.S. leadership. For example, despite claiming 
an ultimate goal of achieving global zero, the 2010 NPR also stated, “as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces.”159 
Skeptics of global zero argue that nuclear parity is an important factor in being able to 
successfully dominate any potential nuclear escalation crisis; this would mean that the U.S. might 
be able to reduce its nuclear arsenal, but that the U.S. should avoid ever allowing its nuclear 
capabilities to fall below those of its adversaries.160 With Russia becoming increasingly assertive 
in Eastern Europe, it is important to consider the implications the global zero narrative has upon 
extended deterrence and assurance. The U.S. drawing back its nuclear forces in Europe to work 
towards global zero, or even stating this goal in its nuclear doctrine would undermine its ability to 
signal collective resolve among NATO states. Furthermore, discussion of moving towards global 
zero in conjunction with discussion of modernization for U.S. nuclear forces may create the 
appearance of contradictory visions for future U.S. nuclear posture, complicating credibility on 
multiple levels. Therefore, global zero should be a part of the U.S. overall global posture.  
The aim of moving towards global zero is admirable. It would also seem like a very sudden 
and concerning reversal if the U.S. completely abandoned the concept. The argument here is that 
it should not be directly discussed in planning documents as it complicates the directives and 
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rhetoric within the nuclear posture. While there is room to move towards a sole use policy for U.S. 
nuclear weapons, it is perhaps best for global zero discussions to take place outside of official 
planning documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 
 
The 2010 NPR made nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation central areas of concern, 
stating in the executive summary and introduction that, “today’s most immediate and extreme 
danger is nuclear terrorism,” and highlighting the prevention of nuclear terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation as the top priority for the U.S.161 It is important to place the threat of nuclear terrorism 
in a comprehensive context. Most forms of nuclear terrorism are low probability, high consequence 
scenarios. Thus, although the threat should not be inflated, it is nonetheless important to recognize 
the various vulnerabilities and risks in order to assess where our greatest efforts should be focused. 
The report looks to enhancing cooperation with Russia on nuclear security as a 
fundamental move toward achieving this goal. However, the prospects for cooperation with 
Russia have declined significantly in recent years. Russia has withdrawn from the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program (CTR) as well as other cooperation programs and violated the 
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). In light of these developments, the various 
strategies for nuclear security set forth in 2010 must be reevaluated. Primary among these was 
the “lock down” of nuclear materials, weapons, and technology.  
Despite the deteriorating relationship with Russia, progress has been made on bolstering 
non-proliferation norms and securing nuclear materials and technology around the globe. The 
JCPOA has created an opportunity to slow and perhaps reverse Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and no 
other state—other than North Korea, which already possesses limited nuclear capabilities—has 
expressed interest in proliferating. The series of nuclear summits established by President Obama, 
concluded in March of this year, led to various agreements to consolidate and eliminate Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) and separated Plutonium. However, there are various areas where more 
work is needed. For instance, further securing nuclear facilities at home and abroad from cyber 
related attacks, theft, or sabotage is crucial not only to preventing non-state groups and others from 
accessing nuclear materials for terrorism and proliferation opportunities, but to ensure the 
credibility and survivability of our nuclear infrastructure.  
The possible impact of a successful cyber-attack on the U.S. nuclear infrastructure could 
be substantial. However, as technology specialist Clay Wilson noted in a 2008 Congressional 
Research Service report, non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (ISIL), 
are more interested in body counts and flashy demonstrations of power than nuanced projections 
of U.S. strategic vulnerabilities.162 Therefore, the most likely threat in this arena is from adversarial 
state actors, not terrorists. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CYBERSECURITY 
Role of Cyber security 
 
 Cyber capabilities have evolved exponentially in recent years, making it nearly impossible 
for government defenses to counter developing offensive cyber capabilities. Reducing 
vulnerabilities to military command and control systems, nuclear facilities, and the overall nuclear 
infrastructure, however, is a challenge that must be met. Failing to do so could have implications 
for U.S. nuclear capabilities, central and extended deterrence, and U.S. vulnerability to nuclear 
terrorism. 
Because of the potential impact of a cyber attack, improving cyber capabilities remains a 
growing focus for the U.S. military. However, these efforts have largely remained unilateral. U.S. 
collaborative and cooperative cyber efforts with allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific are currently 
limited.163 Given the very real danger posed by the current and developing cyber capabilities of 
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states like Russia, China and North Korea, the U.S. is focused almost entirely on its defensive 
posture against cyber-attacks and the use of cyber as an aid to conventional military operations.164 
Currently, the U.S. is not deeply considering the potential of cyber as a threat to extended 
deterrence strategy. In addition, U.S. defensive cyber measures remain inadequate to face current 
and future international threats, despite the known dangers posed by targeted cyber-attacks on key 
infrastructure, communications and vital information systems.  
The potential for these attacks to do real damage is exemplified in various known attacks, 
such as the 2010 Stuxnet attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities and the 2012 Red October cyber-
attacks, which targeted international diplomatic and government agencies.165 However, despite a 
keen sense of vulnerability to these attacks, the U.S. has not devoted sufficient attention to cyber 
security in its nuclear reviews.166 
 
Crisis Escalation Vulnerabilities 
 
Although cyber-attacks could cause significant damage to critical infrastructure and 
nuclear facilities, a cyber-attack could also potentially escalate a pre-existing military crisis into a 
nuclear one, or damage the credibility of U.S. nuclear capabilities. Both of these scenarios could 
have significant secondary consequences for central and extended nuclear deterrence objectives.  
A cyber-attack could escalate an existing military conflict by: targeting critical 
infrastructure, stealing government information, or disrupting communications channels, which a 
government would require for successful crisis management in the event of nuclear escalation.167 
‘Infowar’ style targeting of government information and communications systems could cause a 
crisis to escalate through the creation and dissemination of misinformation and 
miscommunication. Similar events have happened in the past, such as in the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the 1983 satellite warning system malfunction at the command center for the Soviet 
Union’s Oko nuclear early-warning system. In both cases, the reporting of false information nearly 
resulted in the use of nuclear weapons.168 Although the U.S. is attempting to address these cyber 
security concerns with initiatives such as the EINSTEIN program, which attempts to implement 
broad spectrum cyber security measures across U.S. government departments, the potential for 
cyber-attacks to escalate an international military dispute through infowar or to deteriorate U.S. 
nuclear crisis management and coordination capabilities, remains significant.169  
 
Nuclear Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
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 Risks to nuclear infrastructure posed by advances in cyber technology have been 
compounded by decades of neglect of nuclear facilities that have left them increasingly vulnerable. 
During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2013, Gen. C. Robert Kehler, then the head 
of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), stated that he is, “…very concerned with the 
potential of a cyber-related attack on our nuclear command and control and on the weapons 
systems themselves.”170 A year later, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel conducted his own review 
of our nuclear forces, and publicly called for major improvements and investments for our nuclear 
infrastructure.171  
 Many U.S. command and control and nuclear security systems are point-to-point hardwired 
and are a mix of off-the-shelf and one of a kind hardware and software, which makes them less 
vulnerable to hacking, but not entirely impenetrable.172 The Department of Defense (DoD) is 
confident that no cyber-attack could cut off the president from the nuclear forces and controls. 
However, the 2013 Defense Science Board (DSB) report “Resilient Military Systems and the 
Advanced Cyber Threat,” made note of several possible vulnerabilities and inherent threats to the 
survivability of our nuclear command, control, and communication (C3) systems as well as the 
nuclear triad itself. The report expands the standard definition of survivability—the ability to 
withstand a nuclear attack—to include the ability to withstand a sophisticated cyber-attack. It 
underscores that this new level survivability is vital to our strategic deterrent forces because, 
“…the basic characteristics of the traditional U.S. nuclear deterrent incorporates survivability as a 
basic precept; now the U.S. must add survivability in the event of a catastrophic cyber-attack on 
the country as a basic precept.”173 Therefore, U.S. policymakers must take into account the new 
cyber environment as the U.S. modernizes its nuclear infrastructure and review nuclear security. 
 The DSB report also made a case for a cyber deterrent as a means to counter the current 
threat given our current vulnerabilities. It found that,  
“…The full spectrum cyber threat represented by a Tier V-VI [state-sponsored] capability 
is of such magnitude and sophistication that it could not be defended against. As such, a 
defense-only strategy against this threat is insufficient to protect U.S. national interests and 
is impossible to execute. Therefore, a successful DoD cyber strategy must include a 
deterrence component.”174  
If a state-sponsored hacking group or dedicated non-state terrorist organization could successfully 
pull off a sophisticated cyber-attack inspired by or surpassing the Stuxnet attack, the results could 
have grave political and psychological impacts upon the U.S. domestic population. Similar to the 
use of a dirty bomb or radiological explosive device (RED), an attack on a nuclear facility within 
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the homeland would spark panic that none of our facilities are secure, that those who live near the 
facilities are at imminent risk, and perhaps most powerfully, that our nuclear systems are 
vulnerable. This message would do major damage to our nuclear deterrent and our extended 
deterrence worldwide. 
The Stuxnet worm—which first became public in 2010—physically destroyed Iranian 
nuclear centrifuges by disrupting the speed at which they were running.175 Adam Segal, a cyber 
security expert with the Council on Foreign Relations, stated in 2012 that this attack demonstrated 
that even isolated, specialized systems are vulnerable: “…even in secure systems, people stick in 
their thumb drives, they go back and forth between computers. They can find vulnerabilities that 
way. If people put enough attention to it, they can possibly be penetrated.”176 Therefore, the 
number and kind of vulnerabilities to our nuclear security infrastructure have greatly expanded in 
recent years. 
 The consequences of cyber vulnerability to our nuclear security go beyond the immediate 
damage of a facility. Deterrence policy, as described by Thomas Schelling, Scott Sagan, and 
Charles Glaser, relies upon credibility as a cornerstone of successful deterrence alongside 
capability and communication.177 While these academics disagree on the specifics of the ideal 
formula for meeting strategic deterrence challenges, it is critical that our ability use our nuclear 
infrastructure are not doubted by allies or adversaries. If doubt about these capabilities is raised, it 
could undermine both central and extended deterrence, resulting in either an attack from a 
competitor, or even proliferation of nuclear weapons to states currently under our nuclear umbrella.
  
 
OPTIONS 
Option One: Continue the efforts to improve government and military cyber defenses.  
 
The U.S. could work to increase coordination between national agencies, including the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As the 
lines between cybercrime and cyber-terrorism become increasingly blurred, the U.S. will need its 
various departments to be able to better coordinate and communicate with one another. Ideally, 
such an increase in coordination could better allow for various agencies to share vital intelligence, 
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increasing the likelihood that a major cyber attack is detected before it is too late. The U.S. could 
also continue to develop effective cyber security measures through programs such as EINSTEIN 
and increase funding for detecting and addressing the vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear infrastructure 
to cyber attacks.  
 
Option Two: Further explore the potential for cyber capabilities to contribute to U.S. extended 
deterrence credibility. 
 
  The U.S. could incorporate cross-domain deterrence into is policy and defense plans. For 
example, the U.S. could link a cyber-attack on any aspect of the nuclear apparatus to strategic 
response options. Essentially, this option would allow for the U.S. to consider implementing a 
kinetic response to a cyber-attack, significantly raising the price for the attacker. This would be a 
major shift in policy from the usual in-kind response to cyber attacks. However, connecting cyber 
attacks to other strategic response options could raise the cost for initiating a cyber attack against 
the United States to a direct conventional confrontation, which could deter cyber attacks in the 
future. 
 
 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION 
 
Terrorism Threat Assessment 
 
 In addition to cyber-attacks, the threat posed from non-state actors who seek to possess 
nuclear weapons or nuclear materials is also a concern. The rise of non-traditional groups like ISIL 
and Al Qaeda has increased fears of a possible act of nuclear terrorism. There are differing views 
on how worried the U.S. should be. Some, like Graham Allison, think a nuclear terrorist attack is 
almost inevitable and will be devastating. On the other end of the spectrum are threat deflators like 
John Mueller who do not think such an attack would have a major impact. In the middle of these 
two are more widely accepted views put forward by Michael Levi and others that recognize the 
gravity of the nuclear terrorism threat but also the many ways that the U.S. can address this danger. 
What is fundamentally important to any analysis of the threat posed to the U.S. by nuclear terrorism 
is that it can happen in many forms and methods and the U.S. has varying levels of vulnerability 
to each of these forms. 
Nuclear terrorism could include (1) the theft or purchase of an intact nuclear weapon, (2) 
theft or purchase of fissile material and components for non-state actors to build their own nuclear 
weapon, (3) the use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) aka “dirty bomb” or (4) an attack or 
sabotage of a nuclear site.178 
 The first category—the theft or purchase of an intact nuclear weapon—is potentially 
terrifying, but the steps a group would have to accomplish to undertake such an attack are 
prohibitively difficult. Any nuclear weapons state is unlikely to sell such a weapon to a terrorist 
organization, as the threat of retaliation against them is so severe. Even rogue states that 
vehemently oppose the U.S. and have strong ties to terrorist organizations would not give or sell 
                                                 
178 Ferguson, Charles D., William C. Potter, and Amy Sands. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism New York: 
Routledge, 2005. 
NPR Capstone  May 2016 
 
 48  
nuclear weapons to non-state actors.179 In addition, the costs of maintaining nuclear weapons 
programs are high, and once a state has handed off a weapon, it can no longer control where or 
how it gets used. These factors make it unlikely that selling an intact weapon to a non-state group 
would ever benefit a state.180 It is likely that the only scenario where these deterrents would fail is 
if a rogue regime felt its very existence were in danger, such as an invasion from another more 
powerful state. In such a situation, the regime would have nothing to lose by handing off a weapon. 
Short of such a drastic scenario, it is unlikely any regime would willingly give nuclear weapons to 
non-state actors. 
 The likelihood of the theft of an intact weapon is lower than other risks, and it prevented 
by securing the weapons. This is why many worry about Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons 
in Russia and in former Soviet states. While the U.S. Congress approved providing funds to the 
newly christened Russian Federation to move and secure its strategic nuclear weapons after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, this Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) was not renewed by 
Russia in 2014. There was also never a program established specifically to handle NSNWs and 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Congressional Research Service, and declassified 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, the actual number of Russian non-strategic weapons 
remains uncertain.181 Some experts speculate that not even Russia is aware of the number and 
location of all its non-strategic nuclear weapons and materials it has deployed around Europe and 
Central Asia.182  
The fear of a black market in complete nuclear weapons, however, does not reflect the 
evidence today.183 ISIL alludes to having the ability to purchase nuclear weapons or materials from 
corrupt insiders in Pakistan according to the May 2015 issue of its Dabiq Magazine, but nuclear 
security experts like Mark Fitzpatrick of the Institute for Strategic Studies argue it is unlikely this 
is a real threat currently.184 However, the A. Q. Khan network demonstrated that insiders can 
proliferate technology—and possibly materials—through underground markets.185 Fortunately, 
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the nuclear weapons available today are so complex that a terrorist cell would have trouble setting 
off one of these weapons even if it were able to steal or purchase it intact. They require expertise 
to use, maintain, or even to extract component materials.186 
Similarly, it is not probable that a non-state actor could assemble a working nuclear weapon 
from components purchased or stolen. It would take an immense amount of technical skills and 
advanced equipment. This would require a number of successful high-risk thefts or purchases and 
the deliberate recruitment of known individuals with the necessary technical backgrounds. They 
would then need to assemble this weapon accurately and without any accidents. Moreover, while 
apocalyptic terrorist groups—like ISIL and Al Qaeda who see themselves as part of an all-
encompassing global struggle—might have the willingness to take monumental risks to acquire 
nuclear material and manufacture some kind of nuclear device, these risks would likely prevent 
any specialist from assisting an outside group with any critical stage of the plot.187 Assuming all 
of these hurdles are overcome, the group would then need to transport the weapon to its destination, 
which would present a whole new set of hurdles depending on the target. 
A nuclear or radioactive weapon strong enough to do real damage would emit substantial 
radiation signatures and is at risk of being discovered at standard ports of entry to the country. 
Because of this, terrorists transporting nuclear materials or weapons would likely attempt to use 
less regulated methods of entry such as desolate areas along the Southern border. While the U.S. 
may not have total control over what crosses the U.S.-Mexican border, the cartels that operate 
throughout the border are well aware of all trafficking routes. While these organizations are not 
allies of the U.S., they have a strong incentive to prevent terrorists from using their access points. 
Cartels are intelligence criminal enterprises. Simply put, cooperation with a terrorist cell would be 
bad for business. If the cartels were found culpable of aiding a terrorist organization smuggle a 
nuclear weapon, they would face the full weight of U.S. anti-terrorism operations. The risk is not 
worth the reward. All this is to demonstrate while it is not impossible to smuggle a device or 
materials into the U.S., there would be numerous difficulties involved. 
The third option—building and deploying an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a RED 
or dirty bomb—is more plausible than obtaining or building a complete nuclear weapon. However 
the impact of such a device would most likely be much smaller than what is pictured in most 
depictions of a nuclear attack. Consequently these weapons are often categorized as “weapons of 
mass disruption” because their effects would be more psychological than physical.188 While it is 
worth maintaining security at ports and detection and reaction training for law enforcement, the 
likely consequences of this type of attack, combined with the difficult steps necessary for a group 
to complete prior to carrying it out, might not warrant the dedication of extensive additional 
national security or financial resources to this issue. However, this threat does call for increased 
consolidation and security of fissile material, especially Highly Enriched Uranium and separated 
Plutonium, as these would be the ideal sources for an RED. 
The final category outlined is sabotage or attack on a nuclear site or facility. The United 
States has strong security at its various nuclear sites and receives top marks from the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative’s ranking for its nuclear security.189 However, emerging technologies and aging 
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nuclear infrastructure call for a re-evaluation of this issue. In particular, the threat posed by cyber-
attacks conducted by both non-state actors, and especially state sponsored actors, is very serious 
today. This was highlighted during the IAEA 2013 International Nuclear Security Summit, the 
recent Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Security Index, and has continued to gain attention as 
more and more studies are conducted on information technology security.190  
A serious cyber-attack on a U.S. nuclear site requires a level of expertise not currently 
found in an average terrorist organization; however, groups like ISIL are increasingly acquiring 
cyber and technological expertise. In 2012, Thomas D'Agostino, then head of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA), commented that the NNSA was seeing sophisticated attacks 
from non-state actors in addition to the onslaught of daily attacks from different state-sponsored 
hackers.191  
While states have an advantage to some degree in generating offensive cyber-capabilities, 
capacity in the cyber realm is more about talented personnel than funding or material gains, which 
makes cyber more accessible to a broad range of actors. When the ability to build capacity is 
combined with vulnerabilities present in current U.S. cyber-security infrastructure, the threat of a 
non-state actor inflicting significant damage through a targeted cyber-attack is very real. It is 
important to note however, that the current cyber threat is still predominantly coming from state 
actors, with non-state actors ranking as a secondary danger.192   
 
 
 
Under-secured Weapons and Materials 
 
Concerns about under-secured nuclear materials and weapons have largely centered on 
sites in Russia. A 2016 CRS report on Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons stated that there are ongoing 
questions about, “…the safety and security of Russia’s weapons and the possibility that some 
might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group.”193 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
also echoed these same concerns in 2008 when he suggested that the Russian government did not 
know the numbers or locations of, “…old landmines, nuclear artillery shells, and so on.”194 The 
Russian government denied there were any unsecure or unaccounted weapons. Even if Russia 
could account for all of its non-strategic weapons, the 2016 CRS report also has concerns about 
NSNWs that remain at former Soviet deployment sites. According to the report, the Cooperative 
Reduction Program (CTR) never addressed these NSNWs, as the CTR was predominately focused 
on the strategic warheads.195 According to Dr. Huban A. Gowadia, the director of the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office of the US Department of Homeland Security, the vast majority of special 
nuclear material interdicted in the U.S. or en route to the U.S. has originated from Russia or former 
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Soviet states.196 The seizure of such material is not always publicized, but there are no known 
underground sales of nuclear devices, including so-called suitcase weapons.197 Thus, the more 
likely scenario for an act of nuclear terrorism is through the acquisition of nuclear material and 
creation of dirty bombs.198 
The U.S. established the CTR in the early 1990s to assist Russia in moving and securing 
its nuclear warheads for strategic weapons within Russia. During this time the world experienced 
the most dangerous scenario for nuclear security: the collapse of a major nuclear state. The fall of 
the Soviet Union was a major event in global security, and the CTR was established to help avoid 
the theft and loss of material and weapons that were located across the USSR. According to the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, the majority of HEU and other nuclear material on the loose today stems 
from thefts and losses from the 1990s shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union.199 However, Russia 
chose not to renew the CTR in 2014.  
The current relationship between the U.S. and Russia makes negotiating such programs, 
and getting funds approved for Russian assistance, very difficult. In early January 2015 it was 
announced that Russia halted many U.S.-Russian cooperation programs. This includes programs 
to facilitate nuclear security cooperation. Sam Nunn, the former Democratic senator from Georgia 
and an architect of the CTR, said that this development, “…greatly increases the risk of 
catastrophic terrorism.”200 It was reported that joint security work at eighteen Russian civilian 
facilities housing weapons material would cease, and another project at two facilities to convert 
HEU into a less dangerous form also has been stopped. Russia has also cancelled security upgrades 
for sites within Russia’s primary “nuclear cities” where some of the largest stockpiles of HEU and 
plutonium are stored.201 Russia added to tensions by boycotting the final nuclear security 
summit.202 The window for limited cooperation is still open in some ways; for instance, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia intends, “…to focus on efforts to strengthen 
cooperation in the framework of the IAEA,” and that they still plan to attend the IAEA conference 
later this year.203 
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This problem is further compounded by Russia’s economic struggles as oil prices remain 
well below what the government needs to balance its budget. Without U.S. support, it is unlikely 
Russia will make much progress on the planned implementation of improved surveillance for 
storage sites and the detection of nuclear materials at ports and egress points in Russia to catch and 
deter smuggling. 
 
International Nuclear Security Cooperation 
 
 President Obama instituted a series of nuclear security summits in 2010; the final in the 
series took place in Chicago at the end of March this year. These summits have included 53 nuclear 
states or states that house nuclear materials. Each country has made at least one national 
commitment to improve their domestic national security, and 90 percent of the participating states 
have issued statements outlining what steps will be taken to meet these security goals.204  
In addition to increasing the information sharing and opening up important dialogues 
between nuclear states, the summits have made major steps towards decreasing the opportunities 
for nuclear terrorism and proliferation. For instance the summits led to the recovery or elimination 
of over 1,500 kg of HEU and separated plutonium, the reduction in the number of sites that house 
such materials, and the establishment of new training centers.205 A number of states are also now 
implementing new nuclear security legislation, including China.206 
The conclusion of the summits left much unfinished, however. For instance, the 
participating states were unable to reach an agreement on banning the use of HEU for research 
reactors and phasing out its use in civilian reactors.207 This would significantly limit the number 
of sites where terrorists could acquire material as well as the number of sites from which materials 
and components can be illegally proliferated. It is also not clear if these summits will continue in 
the future. It is possible an international organization like the IAEA or the World Institute for 
Nuclear Security could incorporate the progress made within these meetings and establish some 
kind of regular dialogue moving forward.  
 
OPTIONS 
 
Option #1: Address the need to decrease the possibility of a terrorist group obtaining and 
deploying an IND. 
 
The U.S. could continue to further limit the availability of nuclear materials. One goal that 
the recent nuclear summits were unable to fully accomplish was to agree to plans to ban production 
of HEU. Many countries have pledged to convert reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU), and to 
consolidate what HEU they currently possess. These are positive steps. However, a substantial 
reduction of available HEU is possible in coming years only if the U.S. and others continue the 
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discussion. With less HEU at risk of theft, the chances of a terrorist group making a powerful IND 
are substantially lower. Thus, the U.S. should continue both bilateral and multilateral discussions 
about banning the production of HEU. 
 
Option #2: Make public overtures regarding its own nuclear security measures.  
 
As with the U.S. unilateral draw down during the Cold War, our own actions could spur 
reciprocal actions by Russia if only to save face or gain political points. Such demonstrations of 
security could also help deter terrorists from attempting a nuclear attack on the U.S. by making 
such a feat appear prohibitively difficult. If this is accomplished, while terrorists may still seek to 
carry out an attack in a more accessible manner, it is unlikely to achieve the high consequences of 
a nuclear plot.  
 
Option #3: Consider future arms agreements for NSNWs for the future 
 
While current tensions may preclude immediate plans for future arms agreements, it has 
been said the varying sizes of non-strategic weapons make them extensively difficult to track and 
thus agreements on these weapons lack strong verification capabilities. Thus, the U.S. should 
consider discussions with Russia, whether through bilateral or multilateral forums, to implement 
arms agreements for NSNWs in the future. Although poor bilateral relations between the U.S. and 
Russia seem to preclude this possibility currently, the U.S. could consider building confidence 
from limited areas of cooperation to eventually bridge this discussion. An agreement between the 
U.S. and Russia, the two predominate nuclear powers, could also have implications for the NSNW 
arsenals of smaller nuclear powers, as well. 
 
 
NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
Cold War era nuclear crises that took place between U.S. and Russia have received 
extensive attention and analysis. In addition, various planners and academics have examined 
possible regional crises involving the U.S. as an extender of deterrence. However, there remains a 
third scenario which has gone unaddressed in policy and literature. This is a crisis in which the 
U.S. is a third party state. Nuclear proliferation and technological advances are raising the global 
risk of this form of nuclear crisis, as smaller states are acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. 
The U.S. may not be able to avoid becoming involved in such a crisis. Regardless of official 
alliances, failing to do so could have catastrophic outcomes, particularly in the event of a nuclear 
crisis stemming from a military conflict. In addition, the results of the 2011 Fukushima accident 
in Japan prove that even well-equipped countries dealing with a nuclear crisis will likely require 
international and U.S. assistance.208 Because of this rising threat, the U.S. should plan for 
managing nuclear crises involving two non-allied states. This section will discuss elements of 
crisis management in past nuclear crises utilizing the example of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan 
standoff. It will then explore elements of the global order that present a high level of risk for 
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nuclear crises, and suggest three options that could inform a framework for nuclear crisis 
management going forward. 
Patrick Morgan, an expert of regional security management, defines the onset of a crisis as 
a situation in which “…specific sources of hostile intent have been identified by one state with 
reference to another, threats have been exchanged, and responses must now be decided upon.”209 
In such situations, the pressure to react quickly escalates as the actors involved have imperfect 
information about their adversary’s intent and capabilities. Although each crisis situation will 
require a unique resolution, there are several lessons that have emerged from the history of crisis 
management: the importance of transparent communication, the need for increased time in 
decision making, and the necessity of politically-neutral resolution options.  
 
Transparent Communication  
 
Transparent communication is critical for signaling and avoiding misperceptions and 
therefore is an important element in avoiding unintended escalation. Although modern 
technological advances aid communications in many ways, these advances also present a 
significant risk for crisis escalation as communications systems become increasingly complex. 
Cyber-attacks could significantly compromise these systems. For example, Russia has employed 
advanced cyber capabilities that have jammed communications in Ukraine and Syria.210 Colonel 
Jeffrey Church, the U.S. Army’s chief of electronic warfare, notes that the United States has only 
managed to train a few hundred troops in this new arena, much less than China or Russia.211 In the 
event of a conflict in which countries may target each other’s communication nodes to impede the 
effectiveness of combat, the ability of the U.S. to communicate its intentions though signaling 
could be degraded. 
 
Expanded Decision-Making Timelines  
 
Expanded decision-making timelines are equally crucial to crisis management because 
time pressures often result in rapid and unplanned actions with unforeseeable consequences. One 
of the most famous examples of this is the escalation that led to the First World War. Advances in 
military technology and experience from conflicts in the late 19th century indicated that prompt 
mobilizations and attacks would lead to success in military conflicts. Reducing the pressure and 
incentives for leaders to act quickly would increase options for crisis management. 
 
Politically Neutral Resolution Options  
 
Politically neutral resolution options lead to de-escalation far more rapidly than politically 
charged solutions that favor one side over the other. It is crucial to negotiate options that do not 
back either side into a corner from which there is no retreat.212 For example, in the Cuban Missile 
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Crisis President Kennedy offered Soviet Premier Khrushchev a way to reverse overextended 
missile deployments to Cuba without hurting the Soviet position. In exchange for the Soviets 
removing their missiles from Cuba, President Kennedy stated that the United States would not 
pursue further military aggression against Cuba and privately pledged he would dismantle Jupiter 
medium-range ballistic missiles deployed among NATO allies.213 This option allowed both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to maintain their power positions while presenting a means to 
de-escalate a potential conflict. In potential future cases with states like Pakistan and India, it will 
also be critical that each can sell the resolution to their domestic populations politically, in order 
to ensure the same crises will not reemerge once the third party mediator is gone. 
 
CASE STUDY: INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
 
During the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff, the U.S. employed all three crisis 
management tools to prevent the escalation of a highly volatile situation between two nuclear-
armed states. After Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist organization based in Pakistan, attacked the 
Indian Parliament in December of 2001, India mobilized troops along its border with Pakistan. 
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan responded in kind. Needing to address the growing crisis in South Asia, 
the Bush administration designated Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard 
Armitage as the principal managers of the crisis.214 Assigning two principal individuals to these 
roles helped to create clear lines of authority, which facilitated the U.S. decision-making process 
during the course of the crisis. 
With Pakistani and Indian forces mobilized on each other’s border and both states refusing 
to negotiate directly, the U.S. had to bridge the gap in communication to enable the two sides to 
resolve the conflict. For example, the United States strongly influenced Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf to publicly advocate for the elimination of LeT from Pakistan’s borders, which gave 
India the public credibility necessary to de-escalate the conflict. Likewise, Powell and Armitage 
used diplomatic pressure and even the input of China and Russia, to buy more time for both sides 
to make decisions. Stimson Center co-founder Michael Krepon and former U.S. Intelligence 
Community expert on South Asia Polly Nayak argue that the mediation of the United States, the 
EU, Russia, and China lowered India’s willingness to escalate the conflict.215 These measures 
eventually allowed India and Pakistan to back down from their military positions and gave both 
an avenue for justifying these actions in the eyes of their domestic populations. 
This example demonstrates the potential of planning and crisis management techniques to 
de-escalate a nuclear crisis situation, even when the U.S. is not a direct player in the standoff. 
There are two further implications for U.S. crisis management in the future. First, securing a means 
of communication between the United States and a potential crisis party will always be critical for 
any resolution. The United States had to play a decisive role in resolving the India-Pakistan nuclear 
crisis because both sides refused to communicate with each other without an intermediary. Second, 
the importance of establishing bilateral contacts is critical to finding specific parties for 
negotiation. For example, Krepon and Nayak argue that Indian officials were willing to listen to 
American advice in the crisis only because relations between the United States and India had 
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improved recently and embassy officials in both India and Pakistan had established useful contacts 
for managing the crisis.216  
It is also important to consider the role that third parties could play in a future crisis 
management situation. For example, in the 2001-2002 crisis, China worked to restrain its 
traditional ally Pakistan while Russia had a similar restraining role on India, a country with which 
it has traditionally had warm relations. In future crises, it could prove crucially important to draw 
on the resources of third party actors to manage crisis situations. Although each specific conflict 
will require its own specific approach and resolution, these general principles could serve as a 
preliminary framework for the management of a crisis involving nuclear states.  
 
OPTIONS 
 
The current global nuclear status quo remains tense with both unresolved and emerging 
conflicts among nuclear powers. When considering the global order, possibilities for a nuclear 
crisis emerges from ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, conflicts between the United 
States and Russia in Eastern Europe, and threats made by North Korea. Although only the 2001 
India-Pakistan case study was examined, the lessons learned in the historical overview of crisis 
management and the implications of Southeast Asian crises provide insights into policy options 
for each scenario.   
  
 
 
 
Options for Managing an India-Pakistan Crisis 
 
Maintain and Improve Bilateral Individual Relationships 
U.S. leaders must remain committed to establishing individual relationships with both 
high-level Indian and Pakistani officials. Like with Robert Gates and Colin Powell in the 2001-
2002 crises, personal diplomacy from top U.S. officials has historically played an active role in 
resolving crises between India and Pakistan. Although cultivating personal relationships sounds 
intuitive, it takes intentional effort by all sides. For example, mistrust between Pakistan and the 
United States has remained high in recent years with the United States accusing Pakistan of 
harboring extremists; in turn, Pakistan has condemned U.S. drone strikes in its territory. Regardless 
of broader bilateral challenges, the United States must retain robust personal ties with both of these 
countries to ensure its ability to influence crises between them. 
 
Improve Cooperation from Regional Allies 
 
The U.S. ought to consider the likely involvement of other actors in the event of a conflict 
between India and Pakistan. These include traditional allies and even adversaries of the United 
States. For example, both the United Kingdom and Russia have warm diplomatic relations with 
India. In the past, leverage from other parties has proven helpful in increasing crisis stability 
between India and Pakistan, and the United States ought to consider regular discussions with allies 
of both of these states about crisis management techniques. Involving other parties in crisis 
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management can greatly improve the chances of a politically neutral solution to the crisis by 
opening additional avenues for dialogue and internationalizing the conflict beyond the borders of 
India and Pakistan.  
 
Option for Managing a U.S.-Russia Crisis 
Improve Resilience of U.S. Communications Technologies 
  
In the midst of a potential crisis between Russia and the United States, cyber capabilities 
add further risks to existing conventional or NSNW threats. The United States must ensure robust 
communication networks that would remain resilient in the face of cyber challenges so that U.S. 
forces can properly communicate with each other and accurately signal to their adversary. This 
will require further research and development concerning cyber vulnerabilities in communications 
technologies. Ideally, the U.S. government could work with carefully vetted private sector actors 
on improving these technologies. Furthermore, the United States and Russia could ideally rule out 
cyber-attacks against certain automatically escalatory targets, such as nuclear weapons 
infrastructure or even the other side’s communications systems, to ameliorate future crisis 
situations. Although this seems unlikely in the short term with fraught relations between the U.S. 
and Russia, the U.S. could keep this option on the table for future discussions.  
 
Option for Managing a Crisis on the Korean Peninsula 
Coordinate Crisis Management Strategies on the Korean Peninsula with China and Russia 
A crisis spearheaded by North Korea is likely to be the most difficult to manage. 
Communications between the United States and North Korea are already limited, and dialogue in 
a nuclear crisis may well have to go through Chinese or Russian intermediaries. In addition, North 
Korea would likely attempt to utilize cyber-attacks in conjunction with threats of nuclear attack 
and it is possible that U.S. communication networks would be targeted. Finally, the volatile nature 
of the North Korean regime means that it is likely that decision-making time for the U.S. would 
be short, and avenues for slowing down the crisis would be limited. Because of this, it is important 
that the U.S. carefully consider creating dialogues and avenues for cooperation with Russia and 
China in advance. Establishing a strategy for nuclear crisis management to deal with a North 
Korean nuclear strike, either threatened or actual, would be the most effective way of developing 
communication channels and maximizing decision making time available. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
In light of global developments since 2010, it is important that U.S. policymakers return 
the focus of the next NPR to state threats. In particular, the developing capabilities of Russia, 
China, North Korea, and Iran pose ongoing challenges to the ability of the U.S. to extend 
deterrence and assure allies across the globe. While nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation 
remain serious concerns, they are considered to be low probability, high consequence events. 
Shifts in the nuclear and strategic postures of potential U.S. adversaries, however, could have very 
real consequences for U.S. and global security and will inform our own nuclear posture moving 
forward. 
Most prominently, developments in Europe and Asia have created a need for the U.S. to 
assess how it would respond to nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons. In Europe, 
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the U.S. must determine the best way to counter Russia’s assertiveness while addressing its 
“escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine, which threatens the use of nuclear weapons against a 
conventionally superior opponent. The U.S. should consider what conventional and nuclear 
capabilities it needs to deploy to Europe to deter Russia from ever seeking to utilize this doctrine. 
The threat of a nuclear conflict is also a concern in Asia, especially regarding the continued 
development North Korea’s nuclear program. If a North Korean nuclear weapon is ever used, the 
U.S. must determine whether it would respond with nuclear or conventional arms. In both Europe 
and Asia, it is clear that the U.S. must weigh its nuclear and its conventional options to respond to 
nuclear threats. As both of these capabilities continue to play a prominent role in U.S deterrence, 
the U.S. should consider moving from a nuclear posture review to a strategic posture review.  
Modernization efforts in Russia and China bring renewed attention to modernization efforts 
at home. This report outline options for this program that include the modernization of the U.S. 
NSNW arsenal in Europe to provide a broader range of options to potential Russian aggression. In 
Asia, the United States must consider responses to China’s rapid nuclear modernization, especially 
in conjunction with broader concerns about its aggression in the East and South China Seas. For 
the United States, this debate largely rests on whether the United States will accept mutual nuclear 
vulnerability with China. Accepting mutual vulnerability has the benefit of inviting mutual nuclear 
stability, but it has the risk of emboldening Chinese aggression in the Asia-Pacific and 
undermining assurances to regional U.S. allies.  
The JCPOA has eliminated the immediacy of the Iran nuclear threat, but concerns for the 
U.S. remain. The U.S. must first ensure that the JCPOA is effectively implemented. Even under 
the assumption that Iran does abide by its JCPOA’s obligations, the U.S. must still consider a 
future nuclear Iran, as it is possible Iran will return to its nuclear ambitions at a later date. To hedge 
against this possibility, the report considers a number of options which most prominently features 
bringing the GCC under the U.S. nuclear security umbrella. This move would signal to Iran that it 
will gain no advantage from possessing nuclear weapons. Ideally, this would deter both Iran and 
American allies in the Middle East from pursuing nuclear weapons.    
Although this report departs from the discussion of nuclear terrorism as the dominant threat 
to the United States. However, securing nuclear materials, weapons, and technology are 
fundamental to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism and proliferation and this work remains 
critical. Ultimately, this report supports the current plans to increase nuclear security at home and 
abroad and urges the government to continue these efforts.  
An emerging and crucial element of nuclear security not addressed in 2010 but discussed 
in this report is the threat of cyber to the overall U.S. nuclear architecture. At home the U.S. needs 
to ensure that no cyber attack causes damage to a nuclear facility as such an attack could have 
wide ranging implications for U.S. nuclear security and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear force 
overall. Abroad, the United States must work with allies with advanced cyber capabilities to jointly 
improve cyber defenses in at U.S. facilities and worldwide 
Finally, this report briefly outlines a framework for future U.S. nuclear crisis management. 
This includes transparent communication between all parties in a crisis situation, increasing 
decision-making time, and the creation of politically neutral de-escalation options that allow both 
sides to avoid politically unfavorable terms. The United States is a global leader, and whether or 
not it is a party to the conflict, it will need to be involved in the resolution of a nuclear crisis in 
order to maintain and bolster the non-use norm. 
 Overall, the fundamental conclusion of this research and report is that the future U.S. 
nuclear posture review must address shifting state capabilities and nuclear doctrines. Nuclear 
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security, including countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, remains an important 
priority but should not determine the direction of our nuclear posture and development. Each 
region and crisis will need a tailored response as extended deterrence challenges are going to be a 
central obstacle to stability and security; however, these issues do not emerge in a vacuum. For 
example, the posture and rhetoric we use in Asia will have implications for the European and 
Middle Eastern theaters. It is critical that steps to mitigate a potential threat or crisis in one area do 
not undermine our posture in another. The challenge becomes designing a truly global nuclear 
posture that increases the security of the United States and the world. 
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